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“TIME MATTERS in negotiations;  
a negotiation begins, unfolds, and concludes.” 
(Holmes 1992, p. 83) 
1. Introduction 
Negotiations can be defined as processes, in which modifications of elements 
like expectations, concerns, issues and strategies occur (Putnam, 1990). As 
time is a crucial aspect when processes are investigated (Zartman, 1977) it 
should be incorporated in studies of negotiation processes. 
Whereas other methods, like the frequency and sequence approach (Weingart 
& Olekalns, 2004), used to analyse negotiation processes, disregard time in 
their analysis, phase analysis is an appropriate tool to detect behavioural 
changes over time. It allows researchers to integrate time in their analysis and, 
thus, to map the progression of the negotiation process (Holmes, 1992).  
Until today, empirical studies in this research area are sparse and phase 
analysis can still be considered in its infancy (Weingart et al., 2004). Overall, 
empirical results are missing for electronic negotiations. To my knowledge, 
electronic negotiations where tested only twice for phases and solely 
negotiations conducted via passive Electronic Negotiation Systems have been 
investigated (see Pesendorfer et al., 2006; Koeszegi et al., 2007).  
The presence of differences between face-to-face negotiations and electronic 
negotiations has been demonstrated by testing the influence of diverse 
dimensions on electronic negotiations in various fields (see e.g., Delaney et al., 
1997; Friedman & Currall, 2003; Kersten et al. 2003; Foroughi et al., 2005; 
Nowak et al., 2005). Furthermore, distinctions between asynchronous and 
synchronous electronic negotiations have been investigated (see e.g., 
Pesendorfer & Koeszegi, 2006) as well as impacts of different support levels on 
the negotiation process and outcome (see e.g., Koeszegi et al., 2006; Weber et 
al., 2006). As there is no clarity how different levels of negotiation support and 
representation support tools influence the behaviour of negotiators during 
negotiations and subsequently the phase structure of the negotiation process, 
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researchers are invited to further study behavioural changes over time taking 
into consideration the just mentioned variables. 
This diploma thesis and present study is used to provide further information 
about phase structures in diverse electronic negotiations. Negotiation protocols 
from four negotiation groups, provided with different levels of negotiation 
support, are analysed. The novelty of this study is its analysis of phase 
structures showing up in negotiation protocols of different active and passive 
Electronic Negotiation Systems. It becomes thus possible to detect differences 
in phase structure due to the negotiation support provided.  
Two research questions are developed to investigate the issue. On the one 
hand, it is studied whether discrete phases are detectable in electronic 
negotiations in general and then the behaviour within different negotiation 
phases is compared to phase models identified in face-to-face negotiations. On 
the other hand, focus is put on phase length to investigate whether significant 
deviations from equal split points can be detected. This is of utmost interest to 
look whether interval-driven approaches are appropriate to analyse electronic 
negotiations. As, in this area, there are few studies available, the research focus 
can be considered exploratory in nature. 
An innovative, data-driven approach (Koeszegi et al., 2007), combining 
elements of the interval-driven and event-driven approach, is used for the 
conduction of the phase analysis. This new approach overcomes heretofore 
existing, methodological weaknesses. 
The diploma thesis is structured in the following way: In chapter one, the 
theoretical background will be elaborated. Therefore, in the first section, a brief 
overview on negotiation analysis will be given and then, in the second section, 
phase analysis will be covered in detail. In section three, focus will be put on 
Negotiation Support Systems and their importance for electronic negotiations 
and in succession different representation aids are discussed. Based on the 
theoretical background, two research questions will be developed in chapter 
three. The experiment, created to collect information, and the method, used to 
edit the data, are outlined in chapter four. Finally, in chapter five, results are 
presented and discussed and conclusions are drawn. 
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Decision-making
Decision Problem
Decision Attributes
Alternatives
Constraints & Bounds
Feasible Alternatives
Objectives & Criteria
Preferences & Trade-offs
Individual Choice, Utility
Negotiation
Negotiation Problem
Negotiated Issues
Offers
Reservations & Aspirations
Acceptable Offers
Objectives, Criteria & Power
Preferences, Trade-offs & 
Logrolling
Concessions & Consensus-
Based Decision
“Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.” 
(John F. Kennedy cited in Weiss 2005, p. 26) 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Brief Review of Negotiation Analysis 
Many researchers have studied individual decision making in the field of 
decision science and behavioural decision making. Negotiations differ from 
individual decision making as negotiators can not take individual decisions 
without considering the counterpart, but negotiations still include individual 
decisions (Kersten, 2006). Therefore Kersten (2006) argues that decision 
scientists as well as behavioural researchers are both “[…] concerned with 
negotiation processes and propose various constructs to describe and model 
these processes” (chapter 5, p.1). The major differences and similarities 
between individual decision-making situations and negotiations are outlined in 
the following figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Key concepts in individual decision-making and negotiations  
(adapted from Kersten 2006, chapter 5, p. 2) 
Zartman (1977) describes a negotiation as “[…] a joint decision-making process 
in which both parties are necessary to the decision, or otherwise stated, in 
which each party has veto power” (p. 623). He further argues that both 
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negotiation partners have diverse incentives to come to an agreement or not 
and that the most important question researchers have to ask themselves is 
how negotiators make their decisions. As negotiations can be very complex and 
multifarious, there are many factors one has to take into account when 
investigating the phenomenon of negotiating. Therefore it becomes difficult to 
make predictions of the possible outcome of a negotiation as well as to decide 
which variables to consider in the analysis (Zartman, 1977; Yang & Tien, 2005). 
Rangaswamy and Shell (1997) say that “In operational terms, negotiation 
analysis is used for developing methods to achieve integrative settlements by 
giving negotiators decision-analytic and other tools to help them articulate their 
own preferences clearly, and to help one or more parties match up their 
preferences with those of other parties during the negotiation process” (p. 
1149).  
Hitherto different approaches have been used in negotiation analysis to 
investigate negotiations and increase the researchers’ and negotiators’ 
understanding of their complexity. In the literature one can find a wide range of 
approaches named in distinct ways.  
By all means, all approaches to negotiations are linked with each other in a 
certain way. To catch the whole complexity of negotiations, they have to be 
considered of equal importance and researchers have to properly decide what 
they want to analyse and in succession what approaches to use to get valid and 
reliable results. 
The following outline gives a brief insight into some of them, but should not be 
considered overarching. 
2.1.1 Decision Science 
Negotiation analysis is rooted in game theory and decision analysis and its goal 
is to provide advice for negotiators and other involved parties by developing 
prescriptive theory (Sebenius, 1992; Teich et al., 1994).  
The game-theoretical approach has been used as a guideline through well-
structured settings and for the development of negotiations. It aims at providing 
frameworks for conflict situations and is based on the assumption of rational 
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behaviour and perfect mutual knowledge about preferences of the negotiators. 
Major emphasis has often been put on the outcome of negotiations, because 
researchers wanted to obtain explanations of the different factors affecting the 
result. Furthermore, their aim is to get to know how they can influence the 
outcome. Game theory intends to predict equilibrium outcomes assuming that 
negotiators are absolutely rational. Due to the lack of knowledge of the other’s 
intentions and the limited rationality of human beings, game theoretic 
approaches often do not fit when analyzing negotiation problems (Zartman, 
1977; Sebenius, 1992, Teich et al., 1994). 
Economic approaches to negotiation analysis also have weaknesses as they 
often assume that counterparts have full information about preferences and 
further, that the only aim of each negotiator is to maximize their own utility. This 
can be explained as economic models have their roots in labour negotiations 
and price determinations. Whereas game theory models are principally static, 
economic models also take into account the process of negotiating. Both 
approaches, the economic as well as the game theoretic approach, are valid in 
terms of internal consistency, but criticised for their inability to increase the 
understanding of the real negotiation process (Zartman, 1977; Lim & Benbasat, 
1992-1993; Cross, 1994).  
In general, referring to Kersten (2006), decision sciences is thus “[…] concerned 
with the construction of prescriptive and normative models and algorithms that 
tell how a decision-making process should be approached and how to 
determine a decision that meets certain assumptions defined a priori” (chapter 
5, p.1). 
2.1.2 Behavioural/Communication Perspective 
Another perspective when analysing negotiations is to focus on the interaction 
between negotiation partners and the whole negotiation process. Zartman 
(1977) argues that process analysis considers every negotiation as a learning 
process focusing on the mode how counterparts act and react to each others 
behaviour. In general, learning has always been of utmost importance in studies 
of psychologists and Rubin (2002) says that “Learning entails the incorporation 
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of new information or insights, new ways of seeing the world, and new ways of 
behaving, and this process necessarily involves change over time” (p. 264). 
The behaviour of individuals is the result of the interplay between the individual 
itself, the situational conditions as well as the interaction between situation and 
person (Rubin, 2002). Behavioural researchers thus put emphasis on providing 
descriptive and prescriptive models dealing with the real operations of decision 
makers and negotiators, respectively, and their outcome (Kersten, 2006). 
Olekalns (2002) argues that the behavioural approach brought along a change 
as researchers started to concentrate on the negotiators’ cognition. She further 
states that researchers put emphasis on “[…] more social aspects of the 
negotiation, including the development and influence of negotiating relationship, 
the role of trust and emotion, as well as on questions of ethical behaviour” (p. 
40). This approach places value on the negotiation partners and their 
personality taking into account behavioural characteristics.  
To study negotiations focusing on the process, behavioural and 
communicational approaches have often been used and applied in research 
and are therefore briefly discussed now.  
The psychological approach plays an important role in the realm of behavioural 
research. Putnam and Poole say that “[…] the psychological approach 
conceptualizes negotiation disputes as semantic misunderstandings or as 
differences in how interaction is perceived by opponents” (Chatman et al. 1991, 
p. 141). It puts focus on the counterparts and emphasises characteristics of 
both counterparts taking into account their attitudes, cognitions and perceptions 
(Zartman, 1977; Chatman et al., 1991; Holmes, 1992). 
In the course of behavioural and cognitive psychology decision research, both 
negotiation partners are thus regarded as decision makers who make their 
individual decisions due to their evaluation of the negotiation and its process 
(Foroughi, 1998). 
Another pathway, as just mentioned, is integrating communication research and 
negotiation research. Communication plays a crucial role in negotiations as it is 
“at the heart of the negotiating process [and] is the central instrumental process” 
of negotiating (Lewicki and Litterer, cited in Chatman et al. 1991, p. 139). The 
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consideration of nonverbal and verbal cues exchanged between negotiators in 
form of messages is important. As individuals perceive messages in distinct 
ways, there can be deviations between people as they encode and decode 
messages. Another important factor influencing the communication of 
negotiators is the channel used to transmit messages (e.g., face-to-face, 
written, audio, etc). The whole process of message transmission and de- and 
encoding, including the creation, transformation and deciphering of verbal and 
nonverbal cues, helps negotiators understand the meaning of messages 
(Chatman et al., 1991). Olekalns (2002) argues that communication research 
among other things “[…] shifts the level of analysis from the individual 
negotiator to the dyad” (p. 40).  
Weingart and Olekalns (2004) say that “[…] the process of negotiation, or the 
ways in which negotiators communicate in their search for an agreement, has 
received less research attention than have inputs (e.g., negotiator 
characteristics, styles, cognitions, motives, goals; contextual features, culture) 
and outcomes of negotiation (distribution of resources, integrativeness of 
agreements)” (p. 143). To get a deeper insight into negotiation it is therefore 
very important to investigate the communication during a negotiation and its 
process. 
Weingart & Olekalns (2004) distinguish between a frequency approach, 
sequence approach and phase model approach. Measuring frequencies of 
negotiation behaviour sheds light on negotiators’ goals and how they want to 
achieve it. Sequences of negotiators’ behaviour can be described as action-
response sets of behavioural actions. They can rather be reciprocal, when the 
behaviours of the counterparts match; complementary, when the sequences are 
balanced but strategies are not equal and structural when behaviours 
apparently do not match at all. The analysis of phases makes it possible to 
identify how negotiations progress over a specific period of time (Weingart & 
Olekalns, 2004; Adair & Brett, 2004).  
The first and the second approach do not incorporate time, i.e. the progression 
of negotiation processes. However, time is considered crucial in negotiations 
(Holmes, 1992) and phase analysis can thus be regarded as an appropriate tool 
to investigate negotiations and to detect behavioural changes over time.  
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Furthermore, the frequency approach has more often been applied to analyse 
electronic negotiations (see e.g., Koeszegi et al., 2006; Pesendorfer & 
Koeszegi, 2006) compared to methods determining different negotiation 
phases. Therefore, in the present study, phase analysis has been applied to 
explore negotiation processes and provide further insights into behavioural 
changes over time. 
2.2 Phase Analysis 
The analysis of phases during the negotiation process is one stream of 
negotiation analysis putting focus on the successiveness of events during 
negotiations. The particularity of phase analysis lies in the consideration of time 
as a crucial factor (Holmes, 1992). 
Holmes (1992) argues that phase models aim at shaping the negotiation 
process into “[…] sequentially ordered stages or phases that constitute a 
coherent story” (p. 93). He further states that “In phase modelling, the 
researcher aims to identify the dynamics that create change over time, that is, 
what causes the end of one phase and the beginning of the next” (p. 94). 
Time is a crucial aspect in process analysis (Zartman, 1977) and in previous 
papers the impact of time and overall of time pressure in negotiations has been 
investigated (see e.g., Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; Stuhlmacher et al., 1998). 
Recently, phase analysis has become a popular tool to integrate time when 
analysing negotiations.  
Putnam (1990) even states that following a process approach, the process “[…] 
is not simply a variable or a method of analysis, rather it represents a theory of 
a perspective for investigating negotiations” (p. 4). 
Phase analysis falls, as already mentioned, in the field of communication and 
behavioural research, respectively, because of its definition of negotiations as 
processes composed of interchanged communicative acts (Holmes, 1992). 
Putnam and Jones (1982) argue that “Communicative acts embody both 
content and relationship dimensions, both of which take on meaning in the 
context of patterned sets of behaviours” (p. 265). Phase analysis, as it aims at 
detecting regular changing behaviour during the negotiation process, is thus a 
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method to investigate communication and its changes during the negotiation 
process. 
2.2.1 Categorization of Phase Models 
There are different ways to differentiate between various phase models. They 
can be distinguished according to their prescriptive or descriptive character, in 
relation with their number of phases or on the basis of the determination of 
phases.  
2.2.1.1 Prescriptive versus Descriptive Phase Models 
Prescriptive negotiation models aim at providing advices for negotiators to act in 
a more efficient and effective manner dealing with ways how to influence their 
counterparts and manipulate the whole negotiation process. Kersten (2006) 
argues that “They prescribe the best ways in a particular negotiation situation by 
showing what and why a particular action should be taken” (chapter 2, p. 31). 
Many prescriptive phase models do not take into consideration the 
communication between the negotiation partners. Their weakness is that they 
are based on the personal experience of the researchers rather than on 
transactions between negotiators. These models put focus on the decision-
making of one individual during the negotiation process and researchers 
regarded negotiations as joint-decision making processes. Therefore they were 
acting in the field of decision analysis implying that each negotiator is able to 
control phases and that, if negotiators follow the path of certain phases, it is 
impossible that they fail (Holmes, 1992). 
Descriptive negotiation models, on the other hand, are behavioural models 
focusing on the behaviour of people and changes in their activities aiming at 
providing insights in their causes. Their intention thus is “[…] to understand 
rather than judge or inflict change” (Kersten 2006, chapter 2, p. 30).  
When descriptive models possess broad empirical accuracy it becomes 
possible, apart from better understanding the whole process of negotiation, to 
make “[…] highly accurate predictions about results of the similar phenomena or 
processes” (Kersten 2006, chapter 2, p. 30). Therefore, the higher the empirical 
accuracy of a descriptive model, the higher its predictive power. 
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Furthermore, in the case that descriptive models also comprise explanations for 
observed behaviour and detected changes and provide implications how to 
influence them, descriptive models can gain prescriptive power (Kersten, 2006). 
In the range of phase analysis, former researches, emphasising the interaction 
between negotiators, did provide descriptive phase models but unfortunately 
there was no possibility to generalize their results due to methodological 
weaknesses resulting in a lack of portability to other negotiations (Holmes, 
1992). 
One of the most important descriptive phase models is Douglas’s work 
providing a three-phase model out of her observation of a collective bargaining 
process (Jones, 1988; Holmes, 1992; Lewicki et al., 1992). Her model has 
served as a cornerstone for further analysis and researchers have often based 
their work on her findings when testing their own observations of negotiation 
processes. Douglas differentiates between three different phases. When 
negotiators start their conversation the level of disagreement and demands is 
high. Within the second phase, the counterparts start looking for areas of 
possible agreement and negotiators are interacting in an extensive way. The 
last negotiation phase proposed by Douglas leads to the end of a negotiation 
and a possible agreement (Jones, 1988; Holmes, 1992; Lewicki et al., 1992). 
Although her model has been criticised due to its simplicity and her way of 
setting the phases, it has been one of the first steps to phase analysis in 
negotiation research. 
Another important descriptive phase model, which has been fundamental in the 
development of phase analysis in negotiation processes, is the eight phase 
model proposed by Gulliver (Jones, 1988; Holmes, 1992; Lewicki et al., 1992). 
He investigated a mix of different cross-cultural negotiations at a more 
sophisticated level than Douglas and was able to detect eight phases. He, 
furthermore, was the first to combine two processes and h e defined 
negotiations as being composed of a cyclical process lasting during the whole 
negotiation in which information is exchanged and the development of a 
negotiation in stages over time (Weiss-Wik, 1983; Holmes, 1992; Lewicki et al., 
1992).  
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Gulliver’s model has been tested by Holmes (1997) who analyzed authentic and 
simulated hostage negotiations using interaction analysis and phase mapping 
techniques. Empirical affirmation of the validity of Gulliver’s model in simulated 
hostage negotiations could be provided (Holmes, 1997).  
2.2.1.2 Number of Phases 
Phase models can vary according to their number of phases. The majority of 
negotiation models consists of either two, three or four phases. 
2.2.1.2.1 Two Phase Model 
Former negotiation and bargaining theory implies that negotiations start with 
more competitive behaviour of the counterparts (high demands, posturing) in 
the first phase of the negotiation and then continue with more cooperative 
performance (quicker concessions, lower demands) (Jones, 1988; Lewicki et al. 
1992; Adair & Brett, 2005). 
Walton’s two phase model distinguishing between a differentiation and 
integration phase (Jones, 1988) and Steven’s model, focusing on a shift from 
conflicting interaction to concentration on problem solving (Jones, 1988; Adair & 
Brett, 2005), are two out of several popular models. 
Within the differentiation phase, negotiators state their position, offend the 
counterpart’s option and aim at provoking emotions and gathering important, 
detailed information. In this phase there is a high risk that the negotiation fails 
and the conflict escalates. Therefore it is crucial that negotiators, after the 
definition of their negotiation range, pass to an integration phase (Jones, 1988).  
An integration phase is characterised by a problem-solving orientation of both 
negotiation partners focusing mutual acceptable alternatives. Jones (1988) 
argues that “Integration behaviours include analysis of the potential negotiation 
range, discussion of potential solutions, establishment of tentative areas of 
agreement, and the formulation of a final agreement” (p. 471).  
The distinction between a differentiation and an integration phase is illustrated 
in the following figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Negotiation Behaviour over Time in a Face-to-Face Setting  
(adapted from Pesendorfer et al. 2006, p.109) 
In recent years, theory about two phases in negotiations has been tested in 
various areas.  
O‘Connor and Adams (1999) conducted a content analysis of negotiation scripts 
and say that novices “[…] hold a socially shared negotiation script” (p. 142) and 
that they assume that the first phase of a negotiation is used to introduce the 
position whereas in the further stages focus is set on deal making (O’Connor & 
Adams, 1999).  
A time pressure study carried out by Stuhlmacher et al. (1998) also 
demonstrates that with increasing time pressure during a negotiation 
cooperative behaviour increases. 
Recently, Olekalns et al. (2003) conducted a study focusing on strategic 
orientation as well as on strategic function (action and information) clustering 
these two dimensions (see table 1). 
During their study, they put focus on the examination of transitions of stages. 
They considered that negotiators implicitly shift from one stage to another after 
having finished a certain series of duties. On the other hand, they wanted to test 
whether negotiators intervene explicitly to redirect the negotiation process 
naming such shifts ‘interruptions’. As episodic models are more likely to make a 
clear observation of such shifts, they used this type of methodological approach 
(which will be outlined in the next section) to conduct their research (Olekalns et 
al., 2003). 
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Olekalns et al. (2003) used a phase mapping procedure to map the negotiation 
process of multi-party negotiations on the basis of strategy activity. The same 
method was employed by Donohue and Roberto (1996) in their study about 
three models of integrative and distributive bargaining proposed by Putnam 
(1990). This means that phases were supposed to change when strategies, 
detected through their speaking turns, changed (Olekalns et al., 2003).  
They found out that double transitions occurred less frequently than single 
transitions. That implies that negotiators prefer only to change function or 
orientation, but avoid changing both aspects at the same time (Olekalns et al., 
2003).  
The second research outcome deals with the consistency of starting the 
negotiation with distributive phases rather than with integration. After a phase of 
positioning, integrative behavioural moves could be examined (Olekalns et al., 
2003).  
Olekalns et al. (2003) say that “[…] negotiators blended integrative and 
distributive phases, as well as information and action phases, as required for 
settlement” (p. 206). They consider that it would be helpful for negotiators to 
realize when and how transitions should be made. They assume that this would 
lead to more unproblematic negotiation processes and people would not need 
to interrupt the process to reroute it (Oleklans et al., 2003). Druckman (1986) 
already defined a steady negotiation process as a process “[…] that moves 
through the stages with few impasses and no crises” (p. 334).  
Olekalns et al. (2003) thus highlight the importance for all negotiators not only to 
focus on their duty, but also to consider the negotiation process and 
consequently to their findings and in regard of achieving such a process, they 
recommend that “[…] if groups initiate negotiations with an integrative strategy, 
they should pay considerable attention to sustaining that strategy” (p. 206) as it 
is not easy to come back to integration if, by the first distributive move from 
another member, strategy is changed. 
Olekalns et al. (2003) state that in negotiations “[…] action before information 
and distribution before integration are normative” (p. 207).  
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STRATEGIC ORIENTATION STRATEGIC 
FUNCTION Distributive Integrative 
Information 
Distributive Information 
Positions 
Facts 
Integrative Information 
Priorities 
Needs 
Interests 
Action 
Claiming Value 
Substantiation 
Threats 
Power Use 
Bottom-Line 
Single-Issue Offers 
Creating Value 
Packaging 
Tradeoffs 
Creative Solutions 
Multi-Issue Offers 
 
Table 1: Strategic Orientation & Function (Olekalns et al. 2003, p. 193) 
2.2.1.2.2 Three Phase Model 
Douglas was one of the first authors to distinguish between three negotiation 
phases, but, as already mentioned, it was difficult to generalise her results. 
However, her model and its three stages have provided future authors with a 
solid foundation. 
Holmes (1992) summarises various prescriptive and descriptive phase models 
(entire tables available in the Appendix) and develops his own phase model 
based on a comparative survey of the existing ones. He uses an event-driven 
approach to define three predictable stages of negotiations as it is possible to 
detect consistency in the development of negotiations over time although 
different phase models vary in their number of phases.  
Holmes (1992) states that all phase models, consisting of more than just two 
phases, are composed of three types of stages: a problem initiation phase, a 
problem-solving phase and a problem resolution phase. This order of events 
and progress of negotiations corresponds to Douglas’ model. 
In the first stage negotiators try to highlight their position, point out their own 
preferences, focus on differences between both of them and find out where their 
goals mismatch. After the initiation, the counterparts try to start solving the 
problem by exchanging information and looking for mutually acceptable 
solutions. In the last negotiation stage, possible agreements are stated, details 
are taken into consideration and the final agreement is worked out (Holmes, 
1992).  
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Other researchers, supporting phase models consisting of three phases, also 
divide negotiations in sections of spirited conflict, tactical manoeuvres, and 
reducing alternatives to final agreement (Adair & Brett, 2005). 
Adair and Brett (2005) argue that empirical results testing three phase models 
tend to indicate “[…] a gradual progression from a more competitive to a more 
cooperative focus” (p. 34) and therefore resemble two phase models in this 
general regard.  
2.2.1.2.3 Four Phase Model 
Some researchers found out that people do not just become more cooperative 
as time passes during mixed motive negotiations, but that they alternate 
between competitive and cooperative behaviour (see e.g., Olekalns et al., 1996; 
Lytle et al., 1999; Olekalns et al., 2003) which led to a further expansion of the 
two and three stage model.  
Adair and Brett (2005) present a sequential four stage model allowing “[…] a 
finely grained analysis of the evolution of negotiations […] at different time 
periods” (p. 34). 
Their sequential model consists of the following phases: relational positioning, 
identifying the problem, generating solutions, and reaching the agreement 
(Adair & Brett 2005).  
The first stage is used to emphasise the negotiators’ power and status using for 
example statements of affective persuasion or priority information. As 
negotiators realise that relational positioning does not lead to progress in 
perpetuity, they pass on to a stage where issues are discussed and priority 
information exchange further increases. Within the third stage, negotiators start 
to exchange offers and behave in a more competitive manner again as they try 
to achieve a good agreement. The third stage can be described as “[…] a 
distinct, energetic, even passionate stage, with parties shifting between a focus 
on integrating information and influencing the outcome” (Adair & Brett 2005, p. 
36). Negotiators use rational arguments to persuade the counterpart and 
influence the outcome. When parties begin to look for mutually acceptable 
agreements and their number of alternatives shrinks, they have proceeded to 
the final, fourth stage. Both counterparts possess sufficient information and 
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therefore offers (single as well as multi-issue offers) are made to find an 
agreement, but also to accomplish own objectives. 
 
 
Figure 3: Four Stage Model (Adair & Brett, 2005) 
To test their model, the authors used an interval-driven approach and empirical 
evidence for the existence of all four stages could be provided. Their results 
supported their sequential four-stage negotiation model as negotiators did 
proceed from stage to stage no matter of the time they spend negotiating (Adair 
& Brett, 2005).  
For the identification of the phases mentioned above, i.e. the splitting of 
negotiation processes into phases of coherent behaviour, several approaches 
can be applied. Various methods, used to determine different phases during 
negotiation processes, are presented in the following section. 
2.2.1.3 Determination of Phases 
In phase analysis, the definition of a phase has to be considered very important 
as researchers, using different phase models, determine it in distinct ways. 
Apart from this, the definition is tipping the scales for the method used to 
identify phases and the detection of transitions between them (Holmes, 1992).  
To illustrate the complexity of negotiations, hypothetical negotiation processes 
in its chronological sequence are presented in figure 4. The illustration is used 
to demonstrate the variety of complex negotiation histories and the difficulty to 
detect generalisable phases in negotiation processes. 
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Figure 4: Chronological History of Hypothetical Negotiation Processes 
To help negotiators understand the negotiation process in a broader sense and 
to get away from the micro perspective when analyzing negotiations, scholars 
started to conduct phase analysis using the event-driven approach or interval-
driven approach and to differentiate between episodes and stages. A distinction 
has to be made as stages are identified by time and episodes by sequential 
utterances (Adair & Brett, 2005). 
In general and referring to Zaheer et al. (1999) a “time scale” can be defined as 
“[…] the size of the temporal intervals, whether subjective or objective, used to 
build or test theory about processes, pattern, phenomenon or event” (p. 725). In 
relation to the author’s definition, stages are time scales which divide a temporal 
continuity into units of different size, whereas episodes are time scales 
identified in relation with the aim of the study and the content. Furthermore, the 
authors differentiate between explicit and implicit choice of time scales. This 
differentiation can be affiliated with the interval and episodic approach to 
negotiation processes. 
2.2.1.3.1 Episodes versus Stages 
Whereas episodes are identified out of the content of negotiators’ 
communication and can be seen as longer periods of uniform behaviour, stages 
are phases identified by time with freely chosen barriers between them and the 
possibility that different phases interlock (Holmes, 1992; Adair & Brett, 2004).  
Time
Closeness to agreement
Agreement
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Baxter defines episodes as “sequential utterances with a perceived beginning 
point and end point” (Baxter, cited in Holmes, 1992, p. 94). Regarding and 
analysing negotiations from a strategic point of view, an episode can be defined 
as “[…] an uninterrupted run of the same strategy, for example, the prolonged 
exchange of information about underlying priorities by both negotiators” 
(Olekalns & Weingart 2004, p. 6).  
One of the major benefits of using episodes to illustrate the negotiation process 
is that the surfacing patterns during the negotiation can be specified. An 
episodic view defines phases as clearly identifiable interactions and sequences 
in which negotiators jointly arrange a specific act. Episodic models have thus 
been elaborated positively due to their accuracy of demonstrating the 
negotiation process, but have been criticised as generalizations of findings are 
still limited (Holmes, 1992; Adair & Brett, 2004; Weingart et al., 2004; Koeszegi 
et al., 2007).  
Stage models, on the other hand, expect that negotiation processes develop in 
a linear progress. Therefore these models are advantageous as they can be 
used as guidelines making generalizations between different studies easier, but 
have been criticized due to their inability to satisfactorily reflect the real 
character of a negotiation. Stage models suffer from the weakness that they 
describe the negotiation process in a very global manner and therefore 
information and details about the process can get lost (Weingart et al., 2004; 
Adair & Brett, 2005).  
Methodologically, there are two popular approaches which have been used so 
far to detect phases: the event-driven approach and the interval-driven 
approach. Furthermore, a new data-driven approach, combining the former 
approaches, has been introduced by Koeszegi et al. (2007). 
2.2.1.3.2 Event-Driven versus Interval-Driven Approach 
The event-driven approach focuses on either identifying clusters of similar 
behaviour, making a shift when one accumulation of equal behaviour ends and 
a new one starts or focusing on group decision routes and subsequent 
processes of groups (Adair & Brett, 2005).  
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When using the interval-driven approach, negotiations are divided into a fixed 
number of phases before the analysis. Changing points are determined by 
defining a fixed number of speaking turns or time sequences to decide when 
one stage ends and the next stage starts. It is therefore possible that different 
phases interlock. After dividing the negotiations, the content of each stage is 
compared to theory (Holmes, 1992; Adair & Brett, 2005).  
The interval-driven approach is thus resistant to different lengths of 
negotiations. It does not matter how long diverse negotiations last, making them 
useful for comparing between-group differences between and within stages 
(Weingart et al., 2004; Adair & Brett, 2005). Furthermore, the use of the interval-
driven approach and analysis of different stages of the negotiation process can 
help negotiators understand how negotiations advance and change in the 
course of time (Adair & Brett, 2004).  
When using the event-driven approach it is still difficult to detect transition 
points from one cluster to the other as each negotiation’s progression is 
considered. As a result of this as well as due to other methodological 
weaknesses it has been difficult to analyse the negotiation process using such 
an approach in the past (Holmes, 1992). In recent years researchers developed 
methods to analyse different negotiations using phase mapping techniques 
(e.g., Donohue & Roberto, 1993 to analyze actual hostage negotiations; 
Holmes, 1997 to analyze authentic and simulated hostage negotiations, 
Olekalns et al., 2003 to analyze multi-party, multi-issue negotiations). A study 
by Poole and Roth (1989) about decision development in small groups and their 
proposed method for mapping developmental sequences has provided a solid 
basis for negotiation research using similar methods. 
Both approaches are now presented in form of figures to make a clear 
understanding possible. To demonstrate the problematic when conducting the 
event-driven approach, figure 5 outlines a proposed three stage model by 
Holmes (1992). The difficultness of identifying transition points between clusters 
of similar behaviour is highlighted with the dashed, red lines. The interval-driven 
approach is illustrated in figure 6. The terms integration and distribution refer to 
a phase model adaptation of Walton and McKersie’s integrative and distributive 
bargaining model (Holmes, 1992). Apart from this it reflects the theoretical 
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model of the negotiation progress of Stevens (Adair & Brett, 2005). As the 
interval-driven approach is used, the negotiation is divided in the middle of the 
negotiation. Afterwards the content of both stages is compared to theory. 
 
Figure 5: Event-Driven Approach 
 
Figure 6: Interval-Driven Approach 
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2.2.1.3.3 Data-Driven Approach 
A brand new approach, introduced by Koeszegi et al. (2007), combines the 
interval-driven and event-driven approach and has been used for the present 
study.  
This approach overcomes the methodological weaknesses of the previous 
approaches by combining the tools of stage as well as episodic models. 
Therefore it meets Holmes (1992) call for expanding the existing knowledge on 
phase models in negotiations using new and innovative approaches. 
The main advantage of this data-driven method is that it splits all negotiations 
into a predefined amount of phases, but, contrary to previous approaches, 
detects changing points individually. This means that, when analyzing 
negotiations using a two-phase model for example, each negotiation is divided 
into two parts, but the point when the first phase ends and the second begins 
depends on the negotiation and its content. Thus, the length of the phases is 
not externally imposed by the researcher but considers the actual structure of 
the data (Koeszegi et al., 2007). 
 
 
Figure 7: Data-driven Phase Analysis ~ 2 Phases 
However, the approach is not limited to two phases. When more than two 
phases are studied, the method offers a holistic as well as a hierarchical 
approach. Whereas the hierarchical approach first splits the negotiation process 
into two phases and then further divides these two phases into sub-phases, the 
holistic approach sets as many splitting points as desired straight between 
subsequent phases (Koeszegi et al., 2007). 
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Thus, the data-driven approach might not only be more appropriate for 
characterising phases in negotiations, but enables the researcher to study the 
influence of different factors on the structure of phases during the negotiation 
process (Koeszegi et al., 2007). 
To my knowledge, this approach has been empirically applied in only one study 
until today (see Koeszegi et al., 2007). Its benefits will thus be further 
demonstrated in the present analysis.  
A more detailed description of the data-driven approach will be presented in 
section 4.6 of this diploma thesis. 
It has been shown, that phase models have a longer traditional in classical 
negotiation research (face-to-face negotiations), but that its analysis is still in its 
infancy, overall in electronic negotiations.  
Nowadays, however, the use of electronic media for the conduction of 
negotiations is increasing and therefore, in the following section, focus will be 
put on negotiation support systems highlighting their importance for electronic 
negotiations. 
2.3 Negotiation Support Systems 
As already mentioned in section 2.1, negotiators have to decode and encode 
messages during the negotiation process. Diverse processing of information of 
human beings can, thus, lead, among other things, to problems when 
negotiating. To overcome such hurdles and provide assistance and guidance 
throughout the whole process of negotiating, decision support system and 
negotiation support systems have been created (Lim & Benbasat, 1992-1993). 
2.3.1 Brief History 
Negotiation support has been used for almost five decades in an effort to 
improve negotiations. Recently, a whole field of research has been built around 
Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) (Foroughi, 1998). 
Referring to Foroughi et al. (2005) “NSSs are a category of group support 
systems (GSSs) designed especially to support decision-makers in non-
cooperative, mixed-motive tasks” (p. 2). 
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Lim and Benbasat (1992-1993) argue that each Negotiation Support System 
has to be composed of two features. On the one hand, every negotiator has to 
be provided with decision support through a Decision Support System (DSS) 
and on the other hand, both counterparts have to be connected through an 
electronic communication channel. 
One important trend, which can be identified in the field of negotiation support, 
is the development of full-feature session-oriented Negotiation Support Systems 
offering support during the whole process of negotiating (Delaney et al., 1997). 
Such systems also provide “[…] group process structuring techniques, support 
for mediators, and documentation of the negotiation” (Foroughi 1998, p. 18).  
In general, Negotiation Support Systems vary in their form of support depending 
on the researcher implementing such a system and its approach to the problem. 
And, as different forms of negotiation analysis focus on diverse aspects of 
negotiations, they support various levels. 
2.3.2 Electronic Negotiations 
During the last years and due to the increasing globalization of business, more 
and more negotiations are conducted online, moving on from traditional face-to-
face negotiations to electronic negotiations (e-negotiations). Bichler et al. (2003) 
define electronic negotiations as the “[…] negotiation process in which the 
information is exchanged via electronic media” (p. 319). As this definition is very 
broad, it includes every negotiation conducted via an electronic medium.  
Electronic negotiations can be divided into three different models of negotiation: 
electronic auctions, negotiation software agents (NSAs) and negotiation support 
tools. Whereas auctions as well as agents aim at automating the negotiation 
process and are following a quantitative approach, electronic negotiation 
support tries, like traditional negotiation support, to support the negotiators in 
relation with their decisions and communication throughout the negotiation 
process, but individuals remain free to make their own decisions (Bichler et al., 
2003; Schoop et al., 2003).  
For this purpose, software systems, Electronic Negotiation Systems (ENSs), 
have been created and have, until today, overall been used for teaching and 
negotiation training (Kersten, 2004). The effectiveness of such trainings and 
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learning effects achieved is indubitable. Most of the time members get in touch 
with this type of technology for the first time and experience its advantages and 
limitations which prepares them for a possible future usage in their professional 
lives (Koeszegi & Kersten, 2003).  
In traditional face-to-face negotiations the use of negotiation support often 
turned out to be difficult. In electronic negotiations, when Electronic Negotiation 
Systems are used, this is not the case as negotiators can easily take advantage 
of support tools during the whole process. Bichler et al. (2003) argues that “The 
rationale for e-negotiations is, therefore, the promise of higher levels of process 
efficiency and effectiveness, including the exchange of quantitatively and 
qualitatively improved information during the negotiation process” (p. 321). 
Kersten (2004) argues that Electronic Negotiation Systems, among other things, 
deviate from other information systems as “[…] they are network-centric and 
rely on ever-present Internet connectivity” (p. 3). Web browsers are used to 
offer easily comprehensible interfaces.  
Thanks to the development of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) and the elaboration of Electronic Negotiation Systems, the use of 
Negotiation Support System has been enlarged and previous weaknesses have 
been combated (Kersten, 2004; Chen et al., 2005). 
Apart from this, Electronic Negotiation Systems are part of every electronic 
negotiation between different individuals. Kersten (2004) differentiates, in 
relation with the support provided by the system, between passive systems, 
which do not offer any decision support (e.g., simple email/messenger) and 
active systems (active facilitative-mediation systems and proactive intervention-
mediation systems) which actively intervene in the negotiation process. He 
argues that active systems are examples of socio-technical systems and says 
that such a system “[…] comprises people and technological solutions – both 
actively involved in the processes […]” (p. 4). 
A number of classifications of negotiation and group support systems have 
been provided (see e.g., Rangaswamy & Shell, 1997; Starke & Rangaswamy, 
1999; Schoop et al., 2003; Weigand et al., 2003; De Moor & Weigand, 2004). 
These overviews allow for differentiations and comparisons to be made 
between systems.  
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The following figure 8 summarises the classification introduced by Kersten 
(2004, p. 4-5). 
 
 
Figure 8: Different Support Levels 
Electronic Negotiation Systems do, as just mentioned, vary in the support they 
offer and features they provide to help negotiators make their decisions during 
the negotiation process. The next part of this diploma thesis emphasises the 
importance of representational aids in electronic negotiations and some tools 
are briefly discussed and presented. 
2.4 Representation Aids 
Human beings struggle to effectively solve problems due to mental resource 
limitations. Furthermore, when problems are transmitted to other people while 
communicating, obscurities may arise (Weber, 2006).  
Weber et al. (2006) put it the way that “When interacting, miscommunication 
frequently occurs resulting in reduced, incorrect, or misinterpreted knowledge” 
(p. 3). 
The interpretation of the meaning of a certain message depends on how the 
negotiator handles it as “Senders and receivers not only transmit messages, but 
they also encode and decode messages by creating, transforming, and 
deciphering verbal and nonverbal cues” (Chatman 1991, p. 140). 
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As human beings suffer from such restricted processing abilities, representation 
aids aim at coping with mental limitations by presenting and communicating 
information in an accurate manner (Vessey, 1991; Massey & Wallace, 1996; 
Weber et al., 2006). Representation aids can be divided into three different 
groups (Weber, 2006) and are summarized and presented in the following 
figure 9.  
 
Figure 9: Different Levels of Representation Aids 
2.4.1 Representation Aids in Electronic Negotiation Systems 
As well as in Group Support Systems (De Vreede & Vogel, 2000) a distinction 
between simple textual communication support (natural communication aids) 
and graphical communication support (stylized communication aids) can be 
made.  
When comparing the diverse representation aids presented in figure 9 with the 
different support levels provided by Electronic Negotiation Systems (see figure 
8) it becomes obvious that each support level corresponds more or less to a 
certain representation aid. The support offered by passive systems can be 
categorized as natural communication aids whereas active systems can either 
provide stylized communication aids or at highest level also knowledge 
representation aids. 
To illustrate how textual, numerical and graphical support tools can look, some 
examples are now presented. 
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2.4.1.1 Textual support 
When textual messages are interchanged asynchronously, they embody e-mail 
communication referring to the determination of Friedman and Currall (2003) 
who define simple e-mail communication as “[…] almost unique in that it is 
asynchronous, textual, and electronic” (p. 1326). 
Passive Electronic Negotiation Systems offer a platform for negotiators to 
exchange messages and offers without providing any other tools. A good 
example of such an electronic system would be “SimpleNS” 
(http://invite.concordia.ca/simplens/) not offering any analytical tools.  
To illustrate simple textual communication using an electronic medium, an 
invented example of a possible message is presented. 
Message by Mrs. Lee – 10.01.2008 Offer by Mrs. Lee – 10.1.2008 
Dear Mr. Sang, 
my name is Monica Lee and I am working for a 
the very famous KKA Crop Company in Seoul, 
Korea. I am interested in buying Australian 
corn and as your company has a very good 
reputation I would be pleased if you could 
send me an offer for 1 ton of corn. 
Thank you in advance. Yours sincerely, 
Monica Lee. 
 
Message by Mr. Sang – 11.01.2008 Offer by Mr. Sang – 10.1.2008 
Dear Mrs. Lee, 
I am pleased to receive your enquiry and send 
you our offer.  
Regards, Ju-Hu Sang 
Our offer: 
1 ton of high quality corn = US$ 50 
 
Table 2: Textual Communication 
2.4.1.2 Numerical support – Tables 
Another tool used to represent information are simple tables numerically 
outlining informational data. Tables do not graphically present data.  
To facilitate the decision making of negotiators, the own utility of every offer 
sent and received, due to predefined preferences and ratings of issues treated 
during the negotiation, can be presented in a table. 
Negotiated Issue  
Price € 30.0000.- 
Delivery Free buyer’s store 
Own Rating/Utility of Offer : 80% 
 
Table 3: Numerical Information Representation ~ Table 
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2.4.1.3 Graphical Support Tools 
To present information, there is a wide variety of graphical formats available 
and it is therefore not easy to choose between different methods when 
constructing a new decision support tool or selecting one for the solution of a 
problem (Jarvenpaa, 1989).  
Most interactive systems offering graphical support either provide tabular or 
graphical representation to support the decision maker (Remus, 1987). 
Whereas graphs focus on relationships in the information presented, tables do 
highlight discrete data values (Umanath & Vessey, 1994).  
One theory about the effectiveness of tabular and graphical representation of 
information is provided by Vessey (1991) who bases her “Cognitive Fit Theory” 
on a variety of published results dealing with differences between both forms of 
representation. The theory implies that there are important differences between 
tabular and graphical representations of information as graphs focus on spatial 
information while tabular representations put emphasis on symbolic information. 
Therefore problems have to be divided as either spatial or symbolic to receive 
the information needed to solve the task. If cognitive fit between the problem 
and the representation exists, the decision maker will perform in a more 
effective manner than if the two do not match. All things considered, Vessey 
(1991) states that “[…] so long as there is a complete fit of representation, 
processes and task type, each representation will lead to both quicker and more 
accurate problem solving” (p. 219).  
Furthermore, empirical evidence that graphical representation tools do also 
positively influence group decision making processes as visual representations 
“[…] become the focus of attention” and are “[…] successfully used as both 
information resources and vehicles of communication” (Massey & Wallace 
1996, p. 20) has been provided. 
An invented example of a data record of game scores will now be presented 
using both tabular and graphical tools. 
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       Figure 10: Tabular Representation Figure 11: Graphical Representation 
Graphical support tools can help negotiators during the process by representing 
the own utility and negotiation history (e.g., the history graph presented by the 
“Inspire” system, http://invite.concordia.ca/inspire/demo.html, see Kersten & 
Noronha 1999, p. 151) or even the ratings of both counterparts (normally called 
“Negotiation Dance” provided for example by “Inspire” after the negotiation if 
both partners agree).  
Referring to Weber et al. (2006), graphical aids lead to increased conformity as 
they “[…] have the potential to reduce the scope for divergent interpretation 
compared to textual and verbal information that is subject to miscommunication” 
(p. 4). He further argues that relational information, like the negotiation history 
(utilities of actual and past offers), is most effectively illustrated in graphical 
forms.  
In the previous sections it has been exhibited that different Electronic 
Negotiation Systems provide diverse features and that they might influence the 
negotiation progress. Based on findings of Pesendorfer et al. (2006), who 
investigated the behavioural differences during negotiations in relation with 
active and passive negotiation support provided, and Weber et al. (2006), who 
studied influences of graphical support on the negotiation process and outcome, 
the research questions are developed in the next section. 
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“Good science and good ‘speculation’ are not incompatible,  
but each should be clearly labelled so that the two are not confused.” 
(Chruchill & Perreault cited in Summers 2001, p. 411) 
3. Research Questions 
Phase analysis is still in its early stages of development and empirical studies 
about electronic negotiations in this regard are particularly sparse. To my 
knowledge, there are, until now, only two studies available analysing phase 
structures in electronic negotiation processes. 
Pesendorfer et al. (2006) tested the theory of strategic function and orientation 
in e-negotiations by using the interval-driven approach dividing the negotiation 
process into two stages (to test strategic orientation) and four quarters (to test 
strategic function). Whether a differentiation and an integration phase exist in 
electronic negotiations has been tested for synchronous online negotiations 
which had been conducted using the Electronic Support System “SimpleNS”.  
Thanks to the analysis conducted by Pesendorfer et al. (2006), empirical 
evidence for the presence of a shift from information to action as well as from 
distributive to integrative behaviour could be provided. The authors support the 
theory that time leads to differences in behaviour throughout the negotiation 
process on a systematic basis and show that this is also true for electronic 
negotiations. 
Furthermore, the sequential stage model proposed by Adair and Brett (2005) 
has been tested in the realm of the study conducted by Pesendorfer et al. 
(2006). By dividing the negotiations into four quarters and analysing the content 
of each stage, empirical evidence of the occurrence of the predicted behaviour 
could be provided. 
Apart from this study, Koeszegi et al. (2007) further tested whether two, three 
and four phases can be detected in electronic negotiations applying a data-
driven approach combining the traditional event-driven and interval-driven 
approach.  
Asynchronous and synchronous negotiation protocols from negotiations 
conducted again via “SimpleNS” have been used for the analysis. For the 
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investigation of synchronous negotiations the same data base as in the study 
provided by Pesendorfer et al. (2006) has been used. 
For synchronous, as well as for asynchronous negotiations it was possible to 
detect two phases almost equal in length and with a transition point not 
significantly deviating from 50%.  
In all other models, although in general three and four phases could be detected 
in the negotiation processes, significant aberrances from equal split points were 
detected. Only for asynchronous negotiations, when testing the three phase 
model, the first phase did not deviate significantly from 1/3. This leads to the 
assumption that it makes absolutely sense to use a data-driven approach to 
investigate electronic negotiation processes as it seems that phases 
significantly deviate from intervals.  
In relation with the content of the phases, a stronger difference between 
distribution and integration could be found in synchronous negotiations showing 
that in synchronous electronic negotiations phase structures are more precise 
than in asynchronous electronic negotiations and are more similar to phase 
models detected in face-to-face negotiations. 
Empirical evidence proving the existence of the proposed models by Holmes 
(1992) and Adair and Brett (2005) could not well and truly be provided in the 
course of this analysis (Koeszegi et al., 2007).  
The results from Koeszegi et al. (2007) show that it seems to be difficult to 
detect the same phase structures in electronic negotiations as in face-to-face 
negotiations using a data-driven approach. The revelation of only two clear 
phases in synchronous electronic negotiations and two vague phases in 
asynchronous electronic negotiations lead to the assumption of large 
differences between the phase structure of face-to-face negotiations and 
electronic negotiations. The considerably ambiguity arising out of their analysis 
is a motive for further investigating the issue. 
Apart from this, Koeszegi et al. (2007) even invite researchers to apply their 
method to conduct further analysis using larger samples and therefore probably 
making predictions of transition points possible. 
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The following table 4 summarizes all empirical results of phases in electronic 
negotiations focusing on negotiation mode, theoretical fit, number of phases as 
well as the approach used to conduct the analysis. 
 
Table 4: Phases in E-Negotiations – Fit with Face-to-Face Theory 
Until today, only negotiations conducted via the platform and system of 
“SimpleNS”, a passive Electronic Negotiation System, have been tested for 
phases. Whether different support tools lead to different phase structures during 
the negotiation process has thus not been investigated and research is needed 
to fill this gap.  
Furthermore, different representation support tools, provided during the 
negotiation process, are supposed to influence the behaviour of negotiators and 
the outcome of negotiations (see e.g., Beroggi, 2000; Koeszegi et al., 2006; 
Weber et al. 2006). How different graphical representation tools influence the 
decision making process, has already been investigated by various researchers 
(for a review see Vessey, 1991).  
As negotiations can be defined as a joint decision making process (Zartman, 
1977) and as theory (Vessey, 1991) tells us that different graphical support 
tools lead to diverse decision making results depending on the cognitive fit 
between representation, processes and task type, one can assume that 
cognitive fit also influences negotiations. 
noRelational Positioning – Identifying the Problem –
Generating Solutions – Reaching AgreementAsynchronousData-Driven4
Synchronous
Synchronous
Asynchronous
Synchronous
Asynchronous
Synchronous
Synchronous
Negotiation Mode
Relational Positioning – Identifying the Problem –
Generating Solutions – Reaching Agreement
Relational Positioning – Identifying the Problem –
Generating Solutions – Reaching Agreement
Initiation – Problem Solving – Resolution 
Initiation – Problem Solving – Resolution 
Distribution – Integration 
Distribution – Integration 
Distribution – Integration 
Phases in face-to-face negotiation (Theory)
no
Data-Driven4
yesInterval-Driven4
noData-Driven3
noData-Driven3
(yes)Data-Driven2
yesData-Driven2
yesInterval-Driven2
FitApproach Used
Nr. of 
Phases
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The present study can therefore be considered valuable as negotiations 
provided with diverse levels of negotiation support and graphical support will be 
investigated and tested for phases. 
One study focusing on differences between passive and active Negotiation 
Support System has been provided by Koeszegi et al. (2006) comparing two 
Electronic Negotiation Systems. On the one hand, participants in the 
experiment were negotiating via “SimpleNS” and therefore were neither 
provided with any analytical support tool nor with any graphical support tool. On 
the other hand, the second half of negotiators were using “Inspire” and thus 
provided with analytical support and the history graph during the negotiation 
process. They showed that active negotiation support (including graphical 
representation) led to a more effective behaviour of negotiators. People, who 
were actively supported, used less task-orientated communication, showed 
more positive feelings and used less tactics. Furthermore, the building of 
relationship turned out to be a pathway to a better agreement. The results 
indicate that active support during an electronic negotiation leads to different 
behaviour of the counterparts and influences the process as well as the 
outcome of a negotiation in a satisfying way. Whether graphical support or its 
representation plays a crucial role in this regard, however, has not been 
investigated by the authors. 
To my knowledge, there is only one study, dealing with the influence of 
graphical support tools on electronic negotiations, their process and outcomes, 
available. The study has been provided by Weber et al. (2006). His results 
contradict theory insofar as he could not observe significant differences 
between dyads reaching agreements and graphical support provided. 
Furthermore, his results did not demonstrate that graphical support leads to a 
lesser extend of exchanged messages. All in all the authors conclude that “[…] 
graphical representation did not improve dyadic negotiation performance” (p. 
15). 
Weber et al. (2006) could thus not provide evidence that graphical support 
leads to more results or better performance of negotiators. The study conducted 
by Koeszegi et al. (2006) on the other hand came to the conclusion that active 
systems do influence the behaviour of negotiators leading to a more positive 
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negotiation process and better results. There is hence, until today, no 
coherence between different results in relation with electronic negotiations, 
investigations are rare and ambiguity exists which is an incentive to further 
investigate the influence of graphical support tools and different levels of 
analytical support on the negotiation process. 
In addition, Koeszegi et al. (2006) as well as Weber et al. (2006) invite 
researchers to further study the impact of active and graphical support tools, 
respectively on the negotiation process as well as on the outcome and 
effectiveness of electronic negotiations. As phase analysis is used to study 
behavioural changes over time during the negotiation process it perfectly fits to 
conduct research in this regard. 
The following research questions are therefore formulated to investigate 
electronic negotiations of negotiation groups with different levels of support 
available during the negotiation.  
The targeted aim is the provision of further insight into different stages of 
negotiations and extending the already available research. As, until today, 
phase models have been tested relatively sparse in electronic negotiations and 
as the method used to detect phases in the present analysis is new, the 
research focus can be considered exploratory.  
3.1 Detectable Behaviour in Identifiable Phases 
The first research question arises out of the lack of knowledge whether phases 
are detectable, using a data-driven approach in asynchronous electronic 
negotiations, no matter what kind of support tool available, during the 
negotiation.  
In a first step, it will be investigated whether discrete phases can be detected 
during electronic negotiations. 
Focus lies on the possibility of splitting the negotiations, related to the 
detectable behaviour during the negotiation process, into two, three or four 
phases as the majority of theoretical phase models consists of this number of 
phases (see e.g., Holmes, 1992; Olekalns et al., 2003; Adair & Brett, 2005).  
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Koeszegi et al. (2007) could detect all models in their analysis, but whether this 
is also possible, when negotiators are supported in different ways, will be 
examined.  
In a second step, it will be analysed how negotiators behave during the different 
phases of the negotiation process. 
The interesting point here is to, first of all, analyse the behaviour of negotiators 
supported by different analytical tools and, in a next step, look whether it is 
possible to draw conclusions out of the results.  
Koeszegi (2006) found out that active support leads to less task-orientated 
communication, more positive communication and less tactics. Whether such 
behavioural differences will show up and lead to differences in phase structures 
in distinct experimental groups will be investigated.  
As there is no clarity how different graphical negotiation support tools influence 
the behaviour of negotiators and subsequently the phase structure during the 
negotiation process, this question can be considered of utmost interest.  
In a third step, the outcome of the analysis will be used to compare the phase 
structure with theoretical models tested in face-to-face negotiations. 
Koeszegi et al. (2007) could not find convincing similarities between phase 
structures in asynchronous electronic negotiations in their study and this 
research question thus aims at providing more information.  
In relation with the contingency theory provided by Vessey (1991) one can 
assume that dyads negotiating with graphical support will probably come to 
quicker conclusions and will therefore pass through a smaller amount of phases 
during the negotiation process. It can thus be assumed that they do not need as 
many stages as people without graphical support to come to an end and a 
possible agreement. Furthermore, it can therefore be supposed that in 
electronic negotiations phase structures differ from structures identifiable in 
face-to-face negotiations. 
To compare the findings with face-to-face models, the two stage model 
proposed by Olekalns et al. (2003), the three stage model presented by Holmes 
(1992) and the sequential four stage model elaborated by Adair and Brett 
(2005) will function as comparative figures. 
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Furthermore, electronic negotiations with active support systems have not been 
tested for phases so far and that even strengthens the intention to investigate 
the issue. 
RQ 1 a: Which behaviour, if any, discriminates between different phases in 
 electronic negotiations in groups negotiating with different 
 support tools? 
RQ 1 b: What differences, if any, appear between the phase structure of 
 electronic negotiations in groups negotiating with different 
 support tools and phase models identified in face-to-face 
 negotiations? 
 
3.2 Phase Length 
Stage models have often been tested using the interval-driven approach. 
Therefore negotiation processes were just split into equal parts and the content 
of the different phases was compared to theory (e.g., Adair & Brett 2005; 
Pesendorfer et al., 2006).  
In a first step, to test whether a split of electronic negotiation process into 
intervals is appropriate, it will thus be tested whether the phases which show up 
in electronic negotiations are equal in length. 
If negotiation phases significantly deviate from being of identical length, it will be 
clear that phase structures do have a fine grained figure and that the conduction 
of a data-driven phase analysis is necessary to mirror the real negotiation 
process.  
In a second step, the influence of different negotiation support levels and 
features on phase length will be analysed. 
A further, very interesting aspect arising out of the investigation of phase length 
in different experimental groups is thus that possible differences, due to 
analytical support provided during the negotiation, will be identifiable.  
In this regard, it could be assumed that dyads, provided with graphical support, 
spend less time in the first phase compared to the second phase (when thinking 
about the two phase model for example) as people tend to be quicker in finding 
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solutions when provided with graphical support (Vessey, 1991) and show more 
integrative behaviour (Koeszegi et al., 2006). 
RQ 2: What differences from equal split points (intervals), if any, appear in 
 groups negotiating with different support tools? 
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 “Success depends upon previous preparation, 
and without such preparation there is sure to be failure.” 
(Confucius cited in Weiss 2005, p. 19) 
4. Method 
4.1 Experiment 
A simulation experiment has been designed in collaboration of the University of 
Vienna (Austria), the University of Hohenheim (Germany) and the University of 
Tel Aviv (Israel). In total 160 students from all three universities participated. 
More than half of them was German. Some of the participating students had the 
incentive of getting credit points for one of their courses and others took part 
because the negotiation experiment was part of their schedule. The students 
were randomly paired with the intention to create as many dyads from different 
countries as possible.  
Participants had to fill in a questionnaire before they started to negotiate and 
after the experiment. The intention of the pre-negotiation survey was to get to 
know the participant’s experience in negotiations as well as to obtain 
demographic information (gender, age, etc.). Furthermore, it figured out the 
expectations of the participants in relation with the negotiation. The post-
negotiation questionnaire was created to find out how the participants perceived 
the negotiation situation concerning topics like satisfaction, collaborative 
climate, understanding, etc. The questionnaires could be used to connect users 
and their behaviour during the negotiation with their personal information as well 
as their feelings and perceptions. The questionnaires will not be of further 
interest for this study but are used by distinct authors to analyse other issues 
(e.g., Gettinger and Lentsch for their diploma theses). 
The Negotiation Support System “Negoisst” (Schoop et al., 2003) was used for 
the accomplishment of the experiment. To acquaint the students with the 
system, they took part in a preparation training which lasted two hours and took 
place in each of the three universities. The asynchronous negotiations lasted 
two weeks. Participants could freely decide when to start and end the 
negotiation within this period. 
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4.2 Negoisst 
The Negoisst system has been created as a prototype by the e-negotiation 
group at the University of Hohenheim and the e-business group at the 
University of Aachen due to the growing need of negotiation support during 
electronic negotiations and the elaboration of new Electronic Negotiation 
Systems.  
Negoisst tries to facilitate the negotiation process for extensive electronic 
negotiations between two human beings. One of the system’s major aims is 
thus to provide a basis for negotiators to exchange unambiguous messages 
and is therefore based on communication and information theories combining 
document and communication management. Negoisst provides the user with 
the possibility to choose between seven message types and therefore enables 
the participant to clearly define the aim of the message sent (Schoop et al., 
2003; www.negoisst.de/tutorial.php). 
The seven message types are based on the speech act theory of J. R. Searle. 
Referring to Schoop et al. (2003), each speech act thus “[…] consists of a 
propositional content describing what an utterance is about, an illocutionary 
force describing the way the speech act is uttered, e.g., as an order or a report” 
(p. 379). Based on this assumption and to make it easier for the negotiators to 
understand the exact purpose behind a message, negotiators can chose 
between one of the following message types for each message they send. 
• A request in either the formal or informal area. 
• An offer in either the formal or informal area. 
• A counter-offer in either the formal or informal area. 
• An acceptance (‘accept’) in the formal area to agree to a binding 
contract. 
• A rejection (‘reject’) in the formal area to end a negotiation without 
coming to an agreement. 
• A question in the informal area to get more detailed information for 
example. 
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• A clarification in the informal area to answer a question or just clarify a 
misunderstanding (Schoop et al., 2003). 
Apart from this, the system offers two different negotiation areas. The intention 
to build up diverse areas is also mainly based on the theories of J. R. Searle 
and Habermar’s notion of validity claims. The Negoisst feature on the one hand 
enables negotiators to use the “green” area for informal communication during 
the negotiation. Messages in this area have thus no continuative consequences 
for the negotiator sending the message. On the other hand, the “red” and formal 
area is used to develop the contract and get to binding contract arrangements. 
Therefore the final contract can only be established in this area. Negotiators 
using Negoisst thus have for example the possibility to start their discussion 
using the “green” area and later switch to the “red” area. In general they can 
switch between both areas whenever they want. Messages sent in the informal 
area can only be answered by messages belonging to the same area (Schoop 
et al., 2003; www.negoisst.de/tutorial.php).  
Negoisst therefore enables negotiators to state if they want to negotiate in the 
formal or informal area and to specify the category of their message with the 
intention to reduce misunderstandings. 
As mentioned above, the system does not only offer features for written 
message exchange. As the goal of a negotiation normally is coming to a 
conciliation and agreeing to a business contract, the system is equipped with 
another feature. During the whole negotiation there are not only messages 
exchanged but also documents reflecting the status of the current contract. 
Negoisst links the content of the messages with the contract and with each 
message sent a new contract version is transmitted as well. The negotiator can 
chose words in the written messages which are matched with the different 
issues composing the contract (Schoop et al., 2003; 
www.negoisst.de/tutorial.php). 
In this regard a distinction between the formal and informal area has to be made 
again. Contracts which are sent in the “green” area are not binding and the 
counterpart can not accept such a proposal. Negotiators therefore have to turn 
to the “red” area when they want to make a final deal. It is also possible to put 
emphasis on parts of the message and written text by linking them with a 
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selected category proposed by the system. Negoisst offers a list of three 
categories which are “contract-specific”, “branch-specific” and “negotiation-
specific”. It is possible to enlarge this list with other categories if wanted 
(Schoop et al., 2003; www.negoisst.de/tutorial.php). 
Another feature offered by Negoisst is the decision support during the 
negotiation. Users of the system are free to choose whether to use any support 
independent of the second negotiator. To make decision support possible, 
negotiators have to enter their preferences for the different issues which will be 
part of the future contract. Apart from this, the attractiveness of every option for 
each attribute has to be admitted as well. Thanks to this information, the system 
is able to create individualized utility functions for each user and to evaluate 
each offer. This can be helpful for the negotiator as it enables her/him to detect 
differences concerning the preference of diverse offers. During a complex 
negotiation this tool makes it easier for the user to follow the negotiation and to 
never lose the general idea of the situation. Apart from this, to make really clear 
that the system got the preferences of the user right, Negoisst illustrates 
possible outcomes with percentage ratings and the user can change them if 
necessary (www.negoisst.de/tutorial.php). 
Furthermore, the negotiator can change preferences during the whole 
negotiation process and duties can be split up between the negotiation parties 
by marking them with a “red light”, when it is of own responsibility after finishing 
the contract or by a “green light” when it will be the duty of the other person. 
The “red light” can only be activated by each individual for her/his own duty 
(www.negoisst.de/tutorial.php). 
4.3 Manipulation of the Negotiation System 
The major focus of the whole research project lies on the identification of effects 
of different levels of analytical support provided by an Electronic Negotiation 
System (textual and graphical representation of the negotiation history) on the 
negotiation process and negotiation outcomes. In this study, negotiation phases 
are investigated in particular. 
To make such a study possible, the dyads had to be split into four different 
groups. The four groups were all negotiating via Negoisst, but had different 
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levels of decision support available. Therefore it was necessary to create four 
individual systems on the Negoisst platform. Students were randomly assigned 
to the four experimental groups. 
The first group (level A0), called “Control Group”, was not provided with any 
graphical or numerical representation of the negotiation process and utilities of 
contracts exchanged and was therefore negotiating without any decision 
support. Negotiators were using the platform to send and receive messages 
and offers and could only review the written correspondence. The level of 
support provided thus corresponds to a passive support system (see section 
2.2.2; Kersten, 2004). 
Participants, negotiating in the second group (level A1), named “Tree Group”, 
were not provided with any graphical support neither and negotiators could only 
see the messages and offers exchanged during the negotiation as negotiators 
in the “Control Group”. But, apart from this, negotiators in the “Tree Group” 
were, furthermore, provided with a tabular, numerical representation of their 
utility of every contract sent and received. They could therefore see how their 
own utility changed throughout the negotiation process. 
The third group (level A2), registered as “History Group”, had the possibility to 
view the negotiation history graph. The negotiators were able to see, as the 
“Tree Group” members, the exchanged messages and contracts with numerical 
utilities and were further supported with a history graph. This graph illustrates 
the own utility of the offers and counteroffers a negotiator receives. This form of 
graphical representation does not provide information about the counterpart’s 
preferences.  
Students assigned to the fourth group (level A3) could see the negotiation 
dance graph during the whole negotiation and where therefore named “Dance 
Group”. Apart from this graphical representation, they were provided with the 
same tools as the “History Group”. This group was thus the one with the highest 
support and the only group where participants got information about the 
counterpart’s utilities as the negotiation dance graph presents not only the own 
preferences but also provides information about the other negotiator’s utilities.  
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The negotiation history graph, as well as the dance graph are now illustrated. 
 
 Figure 12: History Graph Figure 13: Dance Graph 
4.4 Simulation Case 
The created case for this simulated negotiation describes a situation of a 
European tour operator interested in a cooperation with a hotel in Croatia. The 
characters of the counterparts were the following: the European tour operator 
“Bingo Tours” represented by Mrs/Mr. Gobin on the one hand and Mrs/Mr. 
Alpay, the hotel manager of the new, big “Playa Hotel” in Croatia on the other 
hand. 
The aim of the simulation used for this analysis thus was that two students 
negotiate about 14 issues with predefined importance and reservation levels. A 
reservation level can be, according to Teich et al. (1994), defined as “the 
minimum a negotiator would be willing to settle for on each issue” (p. 79). 
Students were not supposed to change their preferences and predefined utilities 
for any of the issues during or before the negotiation. 
Participants got a detailed, private explanation of their specific role and general 
background facts of the simulation case. The whole role and case descriptions 
are available in the Appendix of this diploma thesis. 
A particular strategy was not suggested for the negotiation, so that the students 
were free in their choice of how to negotiate and behave during the experiment. 
Furthermore, negotiators were not obligated to make a deal. 
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The whole simulation case was designed as a mixed-motive negotiation, which 
means that the negotiation included integrative and distributive constituents. A 
mixed-motive situation is characterized by the interdependence of both 
negotiation partners and the necessity of cooperation to reach a mutually 
solution accepted by both negotiators (Chatman et al., 1991).  
To illustrate the differences in the preferred negotiation outcome of the 
counterparts, the importance of each issue for both parties is presented below.  
Attribute Importance Worst Case Best Case 
Number of single rooms 7,5 % 150 rooms 200 rooms 
Single room price 11,5 % 17,50 € per room and night 30 € per room and night 
Number of double 
rooms 12,5 % 100 rooms 150 rooms 
Double room price 13 % 30 € per room and night 50 € per room and night 
Extra charge full board 5 % 5 € per person and day 10 € per person and day 
Lock-out option for 
other operators 15 % 
Lock-out option for any other operator                   17 
% 
Lock-out option only for youth travel operators      50 
% 
No lock-out option                                                 100 
% 
Airport shuttle service 10 % 50 % by the hotel 0 % by the hotel 
Cost-sharing for non-
booked rooms 5 % 25 % by Bingo Tours 75 % by Bingo Tours 
Number of evening 
events per week 13 % 
4 evening events per 
week 
5 evening events per 
week 
Entrance fee for 
evening events 1 % 0 € per person and event 5 € per person and event 
Price for sight-seeing 
tours 2,5 % 25 € per person and tour 40 € per person and tour 
Meal option for low 
cholesterol diet 1 % 
Yes           42 % 
No          100 % 
Meal option for low fat 
diet 1 % 
Yes           42 % 
No          100 % 
Meal option for diabetic 
meals 2 % 
Yes           42 % 
No          100 % 
 
Table 5: Information about Issue Importance (Playa Hotel) 
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Attribute Importance Worst Case Best Case 
Number of single rooms 12,5 % 150 rooms 250 rooms 
Single room price 11 % 30 € per room and night 15 € per room and night 
Number of double 
rooms 7,5 % 100 rooms 200 rooms 
Double room price 16 % 50 € per room and night 30 € per room and night 
Extra charge full board 5 % 10 € per person and day 2 € per person and day 
Lock-out option for 
other operators 20 % 
No lock-out option                                                  0 % 
Lock-out option only for youth travel operators    66 % 
Lock-out option for any other operator               100 % 
Airport shuttle service 3 % 50 % by the hotel 100 % by the hotel 
Cost-sharing for non-
booked rooms 10 % 75 % by Bingo Tours 25 % by Bingo Tours 
Number of evening 
events per week 4 % 
3 evening events per 
week 
5 evening events per 
week 
Entrance fee for 
evening events 2,5 % 5 € per person and event 0 € per person and event 
Price for sight-seeing 
tours 2,5 % 35 € per person and tour 20 € per person and tour 
Meal option for low 
cholesterol diet 2 % 
No       42% 
Yes    100% 
Meal option for low fat 
diet 2 % 
No       42% 
Yes    100% 
Meal option for diabetic 
meals 2 % 
No       42% 
Yes    100% 
 
Table 6: Information about Issue Importance (Bingo Tours) 
When looking at both tables one can easily see that the importance of different 
issues varies and the mixed-motive character of the simulation case becomes 
obvious.  
On one side, negotiators have quite similar intentions concerning the issues 
“Number of single rooms” and “Number of double rooms” for example. Both of 
them will obtain a higher utility as the number of rooms increases. This 
represents, among others, the integrative part of the negotiation situation.  
But on the other side, considering the “Lock-out option for other operators”, the 
preferences of the counterparts are completely opposed. Sibenius (1992) 
defines such competitive issues of negotiations as crucial as one negotiator will 
always lose value if the other one attains value.  
Apart from this, the “Lock-out option for other operators” is of utmost importance 
for both negotiators what makes the situation even more competitive. This issue 
is therefore a very good example for the distributive part of the case and 
negotiators have to cooperate to find a mutual acceptable solution.  
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4.5 Content Analysis 
Content analysis is a combined research method aiming at transferring a 
negotiator’s words into numbers to further analyze them in a statistical manner. 
This method enables the researcher to transform qualitative data into 
quantitative material (Srnka & Koeszegi, 2007).  
Content analysis is rooted in communication research and was then integrated 
into negotiation research. Thanks to communication research, discrepancies 
and intricacies could also be detected by bargaining and negotiation 
researchers (Chatman et al., 1991). 
The use of content analysis when studying behaviour of participants in face-to-
face or electronic negotiations has become very popular (e.g., Koeszegi et al., 
2007; Pesendorfer & Koeszegi, 2006; Koeszegi et al., 2006; Adair & Brett, 
2005; Weingart et al., 2002; Olekalns & Smith, 2000; Olekalns et al., 1996) and 
guidelines how to conduct content analysis are available (e.g., Weingart et al., 
2004; Srnka & Koeszegi, 2007).  
Weingart et al. (2004) argue that content analysis is “[…] a labour-intensive and 
time-consuming process” (p. 454). But they further say that each researcher, 
who has the patience to conduct this kind of analysis, will get an adequate 
recompense by rich and satisfying data. 
The present analysis is based on the suggested procedure to conduct content 
analysis and get reliable, valid and generalisable results by Srnka and Koeszegi 
(2007).  
4.5.1 Unitizing the Data 
The first step was to unitize the data. “Unitizing” stands for the division of the 
negotiation messages into individual units. As we put focus on content as well 
as on style of negotiation behaviour, we decided to divide the material into 
thought units to avoid losing to much information. That means that each idea, 
regardless of its length or expression (e.g., word, sentence, emoticon), got a 
unique code.  
Sigrid Lentsch, Johannes Gettinger and I were working as coders independently 
unitizing the negotiation messages. We unitized 80 negotiations consisting in 
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total of 966 messages. Each of us had to unitize 2/3 of the text messages, 
which comes to an amount of approximately 644 messages per coder. The 160 
negotiation protocols were finally divided into 12.699 thought units.  
The whole unitizing process lasted approximately one month and Excel was 
used for its conduction. After the first round of unitizing we had to check 
unitizing reliability. We used the Guetzkow’s U as proposed by Srnka and 
Koeszegi (2007) and Weingart et al. (2004) to measure if all coders did identify 
the units in the same way.  
Guetzkow’s U computes the difference of the number of units detected by one 
independent coder and the average number of units between both coders. The 
formula (Srnka & Koeszegi, 2007; Weingart et al., 2004) is quite simple: U = (O1 
– O2) / (O1 + O2) where O1 stands for the number of units identified by one 
coder and O2 for the number of units identified by the other coder. We had to 
calculate Guetzkow’s U three times as we were three coders. The percentage 
of disagreement was very satisfying in each case. The biggest discrepancy was 
0,17% (U = 0,0017) which is still a very good result.  
Apart from the identification of the number of units, textual consistency had to 
be checked as well. Textual consistency proves if the units identified by each 
coder are equal to the units identified by the other coder. We conducted this 
comparison using Excel as proposed by Srnka and Koeszegi (2007). The 
textual consistency of all units, consolidating all three coders, was high as a 
conformability of 91,36% could be reached. This is, considering the scope of 
units, a very satisfying result. Before continuing our analysis, differences in 
textual consistency, as well as number of units, were discussed and one single 
file was prepared. 
4.5.2 Elaboration of the Categorization Scheme 
The second step in conducting content analysis was to design a categorization 
scheme. Coding schemes are normally either based on theory or developed by 
observing the negotiations. Weingart et al. (2004) argue that a differentiation 
between both approaches is not really possible as individuals behave in diverse 
ways. Researchers therefore have to be open to revise and clarify their 
schemes and not constantly stick to the theory- or data-driven approach. 
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Therefore both approaches were combined during the elaboration of the coding 
scheme. 
The categorization scheme used during the further process of coding was 
based on the final scheme of Srnka and Koeszegi (2007). We stick to the 
number of nine main categories, but we step-by-step added, eliminated, and 
changed some of the sub categories. This process helped us develop our own 
coding scheme. Before we started coding, we carefully tested our scheme and 
discussed changing categories and compared them with other previous 
categorization schemes and theory. Furthermore, discussions among 
researchers led to adaptations. Our final categorization scheme consists of nine 
main categories and 64 sub-categories and is contained in the Appendix of this 
diploma thesis. 
4.5.3 Coding the Data 
Based on this category scheme, a single code was assigned to each of the 
12.699 units by the same coders as before, my two colleagues and me. The 
material was split into three parts again and each of us independently coded 2/3 
of the unitized data. The whole coding process lasted a bit more than five 
months and we used SPSS for its conduction as the programme disposes of the 
tools necessary for coding.  
After finishing this process, we had to prove the consistency of coding and for 
this reason we used the Cohen’s kappa as suggested by Srnka and Koeszegi 
(2007) and also used by Weingart et al. (2004) in their guidelines. Another 
possible consistency measure would have been Scott’s coefficient used by 
Poole and Roth (1989). 
The formula of Cohen’s kappa (κ = (∑ Pii - ∑ Pi x Pi) / (1 - ∑ Pi x Pi) 
differentiates between the proportion of agreement among coders which can be 
observed (∑ Pii) and which happens by chance (∑ Pi x Pi).  
Referring again to Srnka and Koeszegi (2007) and Weingart et al. (2004), a 
Cohen’s kappa above 0,80 can be regarded a good result making further work 
with the data legitimate. We reached a Cohen’s kappa of 0,95 and therefore our 
inter-coder reliability was very satisfying. We put this very high inter-coder 
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reliability down to our very intense preparation and good discussion of the 
categorization scheme, before we finally started coding independently.  
To eliminate all doubt, we further applied the Inter-coder Consistency Matrix 
developed by Srnka and Koeszegi (2007). We wanted to see if, although there 
was little deviation, inconsistencies had been committed systematically. We first 
designed the matrix for the nine main categories (see table 7) and in succession 
for the sub-categories of category four “positional offer” and category five “give 
positional information”. Finally we could see that there were no serious 
irregularities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Inter-Coder Consistency Matrix – Main Categories 
On balance, it was a very satisfying result of inter-coder reliability overall 
considering the fact that, with an increasing number of categories, normally 
inter-coder reliability is supposed to decrease (Weingart et al., 2004).  
It has to be mentioned that during the whole process of unitizing, categorizing 
and coding, rules where established and each coder had to stick to them to 
eliminate differences and to achieve reliable and valid results. This accuracy 
can also be considered one of the reasons for the pleasant results of unitizing 
reliability and inter-coder reliability.  
After the process of coding 75 negotiations protocols of 150 participants, 12.631 
communication units could finally be used for further analysis. Five negotiations 
had to be eliminated due to missing or invalid data. 
 Cod 1/Cod 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Main Cat. 1 1594 11 2 13 1 0 0 0 1 
Main Cat. 2 7 624 9 1 7 1 0 3 3 
Main Cat. 3 0 3 1018 3 0 1 1 3 4 
Main Cat. 4 6 2 11 3229 28 0 1 0 4 
Main Cat. 5 0 8 7 25 1322 3 7 10 3 
Main Cat. 6 0 2 3 0 4 630 5 0 1 
Main Cat. 7 2 0 2 0 1 2 429 4 1 
Main Cat. 8 0 2 6 0 6 0 11 783 6 
Main Cat. 9 1 2 4 2 2 2 3 10 2750 
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4.6 Data-Driven Phase Analysis 
To conduct phase analysis, the data-driven approach, combining the event-
driven and interval-driven approach, as described in section 2.1.3.3, suggested 
by Koeszegi et al. (2007) was used.  
As this analysis aims at getting to know whether different representation aids 
and different levels of negotiation support, respectively, during the negotiation 
process of electronic negotiations influence the structure of phases, the method 
is, thanks to its flexibility, an adequate option to investigate the issue.  
The data-driven approach focuses on the negotiation consisting of “L” 
communicative acts (“CAs”) which are all, following a categorization scheme, 
classified. The method itself focuses on the dissimilarity “d” of the sum of 
squared differences of the relative shares of communication types (categories) 
between the different phases. Split points (“s”) are determined where the 
difference (sum of squared differences of the relative shares of communication 
types) is highest (Koeszegi et al., 2007). 
To prevent separations at the turning points, a minimum length “c” for each 
phase has to be introduced. That means that there has to be at least a space of 
“c” between the beginning of the negotiation and a split point and the end of the 
negotiation and a split point. This is of utmost importance as maximizing the 
dissimilarity would lead to the point that phases could consist of only one type of 
communicative act and this would not truthful reflect the negotiation process 
(Koeszegi et al., 2007).  
For the present analysis, the main categories have been considered and 
introduced in the study, as they do provide a solid basis for the intended 
investigations. Therefore, the relative shares of communication acts and their 
sum of squared differences have been calculated for all main categories. Split 
points have then been fixed at the highest level of difference. This process was 
conducted for each experimental group.  
The minimum phase length “c” has been fixed at a 10%, 15% and 20% level. 
Then the decision to use the data with the smallest “c” for further analysis was 
made. The results presented in succession are thus based on the outcome of 
the negotiation split with a minimum phase lengths of 10%.  
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Figure 14 presents a hypothetic splitting process of a negotiation process into 
two phases to illustrate the procedure. 
 
Figure 14: Splitting a Negotiation into Two Phases ~ an example 
For the conduction of the present study, the holistic approach has been applied 
as this approach makes it possible that resembling phases appear when 
splitting negotiations into more than two phases.  
For all experimental groups, the negotiation processes were split into two, three 
and four phases. The following section is organised accordingly. 
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5. Results 
From the final 150 participants, 15 dyads were negotiating in the “Control 
Goup”, 19 in the “Tree Group”, 22 in the “History Group” and 19 dyads were 
conducting the negotiations with highest support level in the “Dance Group”. 
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Figure 15: Number of Dyads in each Group 
Before the conduction of phase analysis, the average number of communicative 
acts per group and negotiator, as well as the average number of messages per 
group and negotiation dyad, have been calculated and compared.  
In the “Control Group” each negotiator used on average 82,33 communicative 
units, in the “Tree Group” 86,39, in the “History Group” 84,61, and in the “Dance 
Group” 83,02. Multiple comparisons to detect between group differences were 
conducted and no significant deviations could be observed.  
The same has been done for the average number of messages sent per dyad in 
each experimental group. In the “Control Group” 10,73 messages were sent on 
average throughout one negotiation. In the other experimental groups between 
12,63 and 12,91 messages were exchanged during the negotiation process of 
two negotiators. Again, no significant differences between the four groups could 
be detected.  
The groups can therefore be considered comparable and further analysis is 
legitimate.  
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Figure 16: Average Number of Communicative Acts per Group and Negotiator 
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Figure 17: Average Number of Messages per Group and Dyad 
The further investigation has been conducted as follows. 
? In a first step, it has investigated whether distinct phases are detectable. 
As already mentioned, the data-driven method discussed in section 2.2.1.3.3 
and 4.6, was used to determine two, three and four negotiation phases for each 
negotiation in all experimental groups based on the nine main communication 
categories (see categorization scheme available in the Appendix). 
? In a second step, an analysis of the detectable behaviour within each 
negotiation phase has been conducted to look whether phases can be 
characterised in terms of consistent behaviour and whether the 
behaviour can be considered similar to detected behaviour in phase 
models identified in face-to-face negotiations. 
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To analyse the content of different phases, t-tests have been applied, 
comparing the relative frequencies of communicative acts within each phase 
with the average use of the same type of communicative acts during the whole 
negotiations in the appropriate experimental group (as suggested by Koeszegi 
et al., 2007).  
? In a third step, after splitting the negotiation into two, three and four 
phases, absolute as well as relative average length of each phase 
considering communicative acts, was calculated for every experimental 
group and it was investigated whether significant deviations from equal 
splitting points were detectable. 
To test whether the different phases significantly deviate from 1/2, 1/3 or 1/4 of the 
whole negotiation, t-tests comparing the relative phase length with the 
appropriate test variable (as supposed by Koeszegi et al., 2007) have been 
conducted.  
A t-test for one sample proves whether the mean score of a sample of variables 
(in this case the average phase length of each group) deviates significantly from 
a fixed value. This means that, considering two phases for example, the null 
hypothesis is that the difference between the mean score of relative phase 
length and 50% of negotiation length in every group is zero. The alternative 
hypothesis, on the other hand, is that the difference is not zero. The conduction 
of the t-test, thus, let one conclude whether the phases do not significantly differ 
from 50% of the negotiations. 
The results will be presented according to the number of phases. Therefore, 
both research questions will be answered and phase structures will in 
succession be analysed for each experimental groups for a two, three and four 
phase model. 
It has to be mentioned that multiple comparisons have been calculated to 
compare phase lengths of corresponding phases of the different experimental 
groups. No significant deviations have been found leading to the assumption 
that, no matter whether negotiators were communicating with textual, numerical 
or graphical aids, phase lengths did not significantly differ between groups. 
Therefore, no additional investigations have been conducted in this regard and 
this aspect will not be further discussed in the following section. 
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5.1 Two Phases 
In this analysis, focus will be put on strategic orientation and the question of 
what kind of behaviour discriminates between the first and the second stage of 
electronic negotiations in the experimental groups. As already discussed in 
section 2.2.1.2.1, negotiators are supposed to pass from a differentiation phase 
to an integration phase during the negotiation process. 
Considering the typology provided by Olekalns et al. 2003 and the table 
presented by Koesegi et al. (2006, p. 13) the main categories of the coding 
scheme (bearing the subcategories in mind) can be classified as presented in 
table 8.  
STRATEGIC ORIENTATION STRATEGIC 
FUNCTION Distributive Integrative 
Information 
Distributive Information 
Give Positional Information (5) 
Integrative Information 
Ask or Give Priority Information (2) 
Action 
Claiming Value 
Positional Offer (4) 
Show Negative Response (6) 
Use Tactics and Contention (7) 
Substantiate Position (8) 
Creating Value 
Make Concession (1) 
Show Social Support (3) 
 
Table 8: Categories ~ Classification 
The process variable has to be regarded separately as it can not be classified in 
correspondence with the classification proposed by Olekalns et al. (2003). 
5.1.1 Detectable Behaviour 
In a first step, it will now be presented what kind of behaviour significantly 
discriminated the first and second phase, respectively. In a second step, the 
outcome will be compared to the two phase model identified in face-to-face 
research.  
Significant results, i.e. communicative acts used significantly more in the first 
and second phase, respectively, are presented in table 9. The results will in 
succession be discussed and compared to theoretical negotiation phase models 
for all categories in ascending order. 
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2 Phases Control Tree History Dance 
1. Make Concession 1 - 2 + 1 - 2 + 1 - 2 + 1 - 2 + 
2. Ask or Give Priority 
Information         
3. Show Social Support   1 - 2 + 1 - 2 +   
4. Positional Offer 1 +  1 + 2 - 1 + 2 - 1 +  
5. Give Positional Information 1 + 2 - 1 + 2 -  2 -   
6. Show Negative Response 1 -  1 -      
7. Use Tactics and Contention     1 -    
8. Substantiate Position 1 -  1 -  1 - 2 +   
9. Process Variables  2 +  2 + 1 - 2 +   
 
Numbers: phase number 
+: Communicative acts used significantly more in phase than on average 
-:  Communicative acts used significantly less in phase than on average 
Plain text:  effect significant at 5% confidence level (α=0,05) 
Underlined:  effect significant at 1% confidence level (α=0,01) 
Table 9: Significant Differences in Phase Structures ~ 2 Phases 
To take a closer look on what really happened in both phases, each phase has 
been regarded in an independent way and relative frequencies of 
communicative acts have been calculated. The outcomes for the “Control 
Group” and for the “Dance Group” are presented below and will, as well as the 
significant results, be used to compare the outcome with the two phase model 
identified in face-to-face negotiations. As the phase structures of the first three 
experimental groups resemble, the graphs from only one group are used to 
represent the three of them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Relative Shares of Communicative Acts in Phase 1 and 2  
(independently from each other) ~ Control Group 
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Figure 19: Relative Shares of Communicative Acts in Phase 1 and 2  
(independently from each other) ~ Dance Group 
Theory tells us that negotiators start with distributive moves and in succession 
they behave in an integrative way (Jones, 1988; Olekalns et al. 2003; Adair & 
Brett, 2004) making a detection of two negotiation phases possible.  
In all four experimental groups negotiators made significantly less concessions 
in the first phase and significantly more in the second phase of the negotiation 
process. This indicates that, at the beginning, negotiators were not ready to 
come up to the counterpart and thus stuck to their position, whereas in the 
second stage negotiators did approach each other. As figure 18 and 19 show, in 
the “Control Group” only 3% of coded communication units in the first phase 
belong to the category “Make Concession”. In the second phase, five times as 
much concession making behaviour has been detected. In the “Dance Group”, 
6% of the communicative acts were already used for concession making in the 
first phase and in the second phase the number even increased to 20%. The 
concession making behaviour (significantly discriminating between two 
negotiation phases in all experimental groups) thus affirms theory predicting 
that, within the second phase, negotiators start to solve the negotiation problem 
and behave in an integrative manner. In general, concession making is a very 
good example of cooperative behaviour. The fact that negotiators made 
significantly less concessions within the first phase underlines the distributive 
character of it. 
The second main category “Ask or Give Priority Information” was not 
significantly more or less used in one of both negotiation phases.  
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Negotiators in the “Tree Group”, as well as the “History Group”, did provide 
significantly less social support in the first phase of the negotiation and 
significantly more in the second phase. Although neither in the “Control Group” 
nor in the “Dance Group” social support provided did provoke significantly 
different phases (in contrast to the “Tree Group” and “History Group”), one still 
can see that social support increases in relation to the other communication 
categories when comparing both phases (see figure 18, 19). This again 
indicates that negotiators move from distributive, competitive behaviour towards 
integrative, cooperative behaviour as theory tells us (Jones, 1988; Olekalns et 
al. 2003; Adair & Brett, 2004). 
In all four experimental groups significantly more positional offers were 
exchanged during the first phase of the negotiation. Significantly less positional 
offers were made in the second phase of the negotiation in the “Tree Group” 
and the “History Group”. In the “Control Group” 43% and in the “Dance Group” 
38% of the first phase are used to make positional offers. This is typical for a 
differentiation phase in a negotiation as positional offers are used to state the 
own position. Whereas in the “Control Group” still 1/4 of the second phase is 
composed of exchanged positional offers, in the “Dance Group” only 16% of the 
communicational acts are positional offers. 
Negotiators in the “Control Group” and the “Tree Group” did exchange 
significantly more positional information in the first phase of the negotiation and 
significantly less in the second phase. This is also true for the second phase in 
the “History Group”. Communicative acts, coded within the fifth category “Give 
Positional Information”, are, like positional offers, used to position oneself, 
probably to provoke emotions by persuasive arguments or stating facts (Jones, 
1988). In all experimental groups, apart from the “Dance Group”, this category 
also leads to a differentiation of two phases of the whole negotiation process. In 
the “Control Group” for example, negotiators provided positional information 
(persuasive and self-supporting statements as well as product/service related 
facts) significantly more in the first phase and significantly less in the second 
phase.  
Negative emotions have been shown significantly less within the first phase of 
the negotiation process in dyads negotiating in the “Control Group” and “Tree 
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Group”. Considering the fact that a differentiation phase is described as the 
phase where the risk that negotiations fail is highest (Jones, 1988), it is 
surprising that in the “Control Group” as well as in the “History Group” negative 
emotions have been shown significantly less within this phase. On the other 
hand, a very low level of negative emotions is typical for an orientation phase in 
a negotiation (Koeszegi et al., 2007) and apart from this, one could argue that 
negotiators do reject offers during the whole negotiation process but that, at the 
beginning of negotiations, negative emotions are not apparently shown.  
Furthermore, negotiators did substantiate the own position significantly less in 
the first phase in all groups, apart from the “Dance Group” and even 
significantly more in the second phase in the “History Group”. This is another 
interesting and surprising result because substantiating the own position can be 
categorized as a typical kind of behaviour within a differentiation phase, but in 
all experimental groups, apart from the “Dance Group”, significantly less kind of 
this type of behaviour has been used within the first phase what thus contradicts 
theory. In the “Dance Group”, in both phases, 6% of the communicative acts 
have been coded in this category and no significant differences could be 
detected. 
Apart from this, in all groups, except the “Dance group”, communication about 
process has been significantly more in the second phase of the negotiation 
process. The behaviour in both phases in the “Control Group” and the “Dance 
Group” is graphically presented in figure 20 and 21 to illustrate the differences.  
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Figure 20: Phase Structure Control Group ~ Relative Use of Main Categories ~ Two 
Phases 
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Categories ~ 2 Phases ~ Dance
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Phase1
Phase2
 
 
Figure 21: Phase Structure Dance Group ~ Relative Use of Main Categories ~ Two Phases 
The results generally indicate that the phase structures in the “Control Group”, 
the “Tree Group” as well as the “History Group” do resemble the two phase 
model detected in face-to-face negotiations. The behaviour in the first phase 
can be described as a distribution phase as negotiators do put focus on their 
own position, make a lot of positional offers, provide positional information, 
make few concessions and provide less social support. The second phase 
shows characteristics of an integration phase as negotiators make more 
concessions, exchange less positional offers, give less positional information 
and care more about each other (social support).  
In the “Dance Group” the phase structure is not that clear. Although in general 
the same trend can be detected when analysing what happens in the different 
phases independently of each other, in relation with significant discriminations, 
two clear phases did not show up. In this group only concession making, as well 
as positional offers, led to a differentiation. One can thus assume that the 
provision of the negotiation dance graph up from the beginning of the 
negotiation process leads to different negotiation strategies of negotiators 
insofar that various types of behaviour are not concentrated in two significantly 
different phases and that people are negotiating in a more integrative way up 
from the beginning.  
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5.1.2 Phase Length 
The second research question deals with the phase length of different 
negotiation phases and whether it makes sense to split negotiations into 
intervals, applying an interval-driven approach, when conducting phase 
analysis. The absolute as well as relative lengths of both phases are now 
presented for each experimental group. 
 Absolute Length Relative Length 
Group Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 
Control 65,70 98,96 39,90% 60,10% 
Tree 79,63 93,15 46,09% 53,91% 
History 82,80 86,42 48,93% 51,07% 
Dance 88,35 77,69 53,21% 46,79% 
All Groups (Average) 79,12 89,06 47,03% 52,97% 
 
Table 10: Average Absolute and Relative Length of Two Phases per Group and Dyad 
As presented in table 10, the first phase of all negotiations consists on average 
of approximately 79 communicative acts per dyad and group and the second 
phase of about 89 communicative acts per dyad and group.  
In all experimental groups, apart from the “Dance Group”, the first phase 
consists in general of less communicative acts than the second one.  
In relation with the results of the t-test, testing the phase length against the 
hypothesis that each phase is equal to one half, no group shows significant 
differences. This means that neither the first phase nor the second phase differs 
significantly from 50% of the whole negotiation in all experimental groups. The 
results are summarized and presented in succession and figure 22 is provided 
to represent the phase length for each experimental group. 
Test Variable = 0,5 
Group T df Significance (two-sided) 
Control +/- 1,636 14 0,124 
Tree +/- 0,662 18 0,517 
History +/- 0,221 21 0,828 
Dance +/- 0,591 18 0,562 
 
Table 11: Length Deviations from a Half 
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Figure 22: Average Relative Length of Phases in Experimental Groups, Two Phases 
The results confirm the findings of Koeszegi et al. (2007) indicating that in 
asynchronous electronic negotiations two phases do not significantly differ from 
50% of negotiation length.  
The results show that this is true, no matter whether negotiators are supported 
with textual communication aids, numerical communication aids or graphical 
communication aids. 
Negotiation theory, implying that negotiations can be split into two equal phases 
(Jones, 1988; Olekalns et al., 2003; Adair & Brett 2005) can thus be affirmed as 
well for asynchronous electronic negotiations conducted through passive and 
active support systems varying in the level of analytical support offered. 
Although the speculation that people with graphical support will probably spend 
less time in the first phase appears true (less communicative acts in the first 
phase) for the “Dance Group”, in which negotiators were provided with the 
negotiation dance graph, the difference is not significant, neither in comparison 
with 50% of the whole negotiation nor compared to the other groups. 
5.1.3 Brief Summary 
Briefly summarising the results of the analysis of a two phase structure during 
negotiation processes, it can be said that for all experimental groups, apart from 
the “Dance Group”, it was possible to identify two negotiation phases, a 
differentiation and an integration phase. In negotiations provided with the 
negotiation dance graph, two clear phases did not show up, indicating that 
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negotiation processes do have a different structure. In all experimental groups, 
phases do not significantly differ from being equal in length. Therefore, an 
interval-driven approach can be considered appropriate when analysing two 
negotiation phases. 
It is still not clear where the behavioural differences between the “Dance Group” 
and the other groups finally come from and further research is needed to 
investigate the issue.  
It would be interesting to study, for example, whether the differences detected 
by analysing the data in an exploratory way, also lead to significant between 
group differences. The outcome of this study leads to the assumption that the 
behaviour of negotiators provided with a negotiation dance graph, and therefore 
with information about the own as well as the counterparts utilities, differs 
significantly from negotiators provided with less support.  
Furthermore, an interesting question arising is whether more detailed 
differences can be detected. Therefore also the subcategories should be 
analysed to get an even deeper insight into the behavioural changes during the 
negotiation process.  
In general, as three out of the four experimental groups were supported with 
active negotiation support and only one group appears to differ from the others, 
when testing the negotiations for two phases, it finally can be assumed that 
graphical representation leads to differences in phase structures. It appears that 
the negotiation dance graph leads to different behaviour during the negotiation 
process and thus to a different phase structure of the negotiation process 
compared to negotiations not supported with this tool.  
5.2 Three Phases 
As already mentioned, the holistic approach has been used to conduct data-
driven phase analysis and split the negotiations into three phases.  
5.2.1 Detectable Behaviour 
It was possible to detect two splitting points for all experimental groups. 
Therefore, in a second step, it was investigated whether communicative acts 
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have been used significantly more or less, respectively, in the different phases 
than on average in the whole negotiation. The results are presented in table 12 
and will be described in succession. 
3 Phases Control Tree History Dance 
1. Make Concession 1 -   1 -  3 + 1 - 2 +  1 -  3 + 
2. Ask or Give Priority 
Information             
3. Show Social Support        2 - 3 +    
4. Positional Offer 1 +   1 +  3 - 1 +  3 - 1 +  3 - 
5. Give Positional Information 1 +  3 -   3 -   3 -   3 - 
6. Show Negative Response 1 -         1 -   
7. Use Tactics and Contention       1 -      
8. Substantiate Position 1 -      1 -  3 +    
9. Process Variables 1 -     3 +  2 - 3 +  2 - 3 + 
 
Numbers: phase number 
+: Communicative acts used significantly more in phase than on average 
-:  Communicative acts used significantly less in phase than on average 
Plain text:  effect significant at 5% confidence level (α=0,05) 
Underlined:  effect significant at 1% confidence level (α=0,01) 
Table 12: Significant Differences in Phase Structures ~ 3 Phases 
The behaviour in each phase independently has also been investigated and 
compared to the three phase model provided by Holmes (1992). Referring to 
Holmes (1992), negotiators are supposed to pass through three stages during 
the negotiation process: a problem initiation phase, a problem solving phase 
and a problem resolution phase (see section 2.2.1.2.2).  
In the first phase, in all experimental groups, negotiators made significantly less 
concessions compared to the concession-making behaviour during the whole 
negotiation and significantly more positional offers. On the other hand, in the 
third phase, in the “Tree Group” and the “Dance Group” significantly more 
concessions and less positional offers were made. In the “History Group” the 
negotiators made already significantly more concessions in the second 
negotiation phase and, as in the former groups, also significantly less positional 
offers in the third negotiation phase. 
Apart from this, positional information was significantly more used in the first 
phase and significantly less in the third phase in the “Control Group”. 
Furthermore, negative emotions as well as substantive behaviour and process 
oriented communication have been significantly less used within the first part of 
the negotiation. What attracts attention is that significant results were almost 
only detectable within the first negotiation phase in this experimental group. 
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Negotiators of the “Tree Group” gave significantly less positional information in 
the third phase and communication about process was significantly higher in the 
third phase of the negotiation. 
In the “History Group” significantly less social support was provided in the 
second negotiation phase and significantly more in the third negotiation phase. 
Furthermore, tactics were used significantly less in the first phase and 
negotiators substantiated position significantly less in the first and significantly 
more in the third phase. Process oriented communication was significantly 
higher in the third and significantly lower in the second negotiation phase. 
Positional information was also significantly less provided in the third phase in 
the “Dance Group”. Furthermore, negotiators did show significantly less 
negative emotions in the first phase and process oriented communication was, 
as in the “History Group”, significantly lower in the second and significantly 
higher in the third phase. 
In all experimental groups most significant results could be detected in the first 
as well as the third phase, meaning that communicative acts of a certain 
category were used significantly more or less in the opening and closing phase 
of the negotiation than on average. In two out of four experimental groups, even 
no single significant results could be obtained in the second phase. This leads 
to the assumption that, in general, the behaviour in the second phase, does not 
significantly deviate from the average behaviour throughout the negotiation, but 
that significant behavioural changes are detectable between the first and the 
third negotiation phase in comparison with the average behaviour during the 
whole negotiation process. 
The significant results indicate that the first phase in all experimental groups 
can be described as a kind of differentiation phase and resembles the 
behaviour detected in the first phase of the presented two phase model. The 
same is true for the third phase which is in a sense similar to the second phase 
of the two phase model.  
To get to know what happens in the second phase, this phase has been 
analysed independently and the outcome is graphically presented below and 
will be discussed in succession. 
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Figure 23: Relative Shares of Communicative Acts in Phase 2 ~ 3 Phase Model 
In all experimental groups major emphasis in the second phase is still put on 
positional offers, but also already on concession making. Holmes (1992) defines 
the second phase as characterised by information exchange and the start to 
look for mutual acceptable information. The results of the present analysis do 
confirm his model insofar as negotiators do already make concessions and 
approach the counterpart, but a trend towards a high percentage of information 
exchange could not be detected. Koeszegi et al. (2007) describe the second 
negotiation phase detected in the three phase model as a contentious one, but, 
in this case, it can probably be better described as a “transitional period/phase”, 
a phase in which negotiators pass over from a distributive to an integrative 
strategy.  
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5.2.2 Phase Length 
To concentrate again also on the second research question, the absolute and 
relative phase length per group and dyad have been calculated and the results 
are summarised in table 13. 
 Absolute Length Relative Length 
Group Ph 1 Ph 2 Ph 3 Ph 1 Ph 2 Ph 3 
Control 55,67 38,65 70,35 33,81% 23,47% 42,72% 
Tree 74,53 36,64 61,61 43,14% 21,21% 35,66% 
History 75,50 37,53 56,20 44,62% 22,17% 33,21% 
Dance 60,40 27,92 77,73 36,38% 16,81% 46,81% 
All Groups (Average) 66,41 35,18 66,60 39,49% 20,92% 39,60% 
 
Table 13: Average Absolute and Relative Length of Three Phases per Group and Dyad 
In all experimental groups the second phase consists of less communicative 
acts than the first and third negotiation phase. Whereas in the “Tree Group” and 
the “History Group” the first phase consists of most communicative acts, the 
highest amount of communicative acts can be found in the third phase in the 
“Control Group” and the “Dance Group”. 
The results of the t-test presented in table 14 show that in every group the 
second phase differs significantly from 1/3 (α = 5% for the “Control Group” and 
1% for the other experimental groups). The second phase is significantly shorter 
in every case.  
Apart from this, significant differences were detectable for the first phase of the 
“Tree Group” (α = 5%) and the “History Group” (α = 1%). In both cases the first 
phase was significantly longer than 1/3 of the whole negotiation. In the “Dance 
Group”, the group with highest analytical support provided, the third phase was 
significantly longer at a confidence level of 1%.  
In the “Control Group”, apart from the second phase, no significant deviations 
show up. 
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Test Variable = 0,333 
Group T df Significance (two-sided) 
Control Phase 1 0,087 14 0,932 
Control Phase 2 - 2,292 14 0,038 
Control Phase 3 1,605 14 0,131 
Tree Phase 1 2,156 18 0,045 
Tree Phase 2 - 3,089 18 0,006 
Tree Phase 3 0,542 18 0,595 
History Phase 1 2,834 21 0,010 
History Phase 2 - 3,515 21 0,002 
History Phase 3 - 0,036 21 0,972 
Dance Phase 1 0,740 18 0,469 
Dance Phase 2 - 23,414 18 0,000 
Dance Phase 3 3,223 18 0,005 
 
Table 14: Length Deviations from one Third ~ Results 
3 Phases
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Control Tree History Dance
 
 
Figure 24: Average Relative Length of Phases in Experimental Groups, Three Phases 
The results indicate that it is not possible to detect three negotiation phases 
equal in length. This confirms the results presented by Koeszegi et al. (2007) for 
asynchronous electronic negotiations. For all experimental groups, the second 
phase is significantly shorter leading to the assumption that, when considering 
three negotiation phases in electronic negotiations, they should not be 
considered of equal length/as intervals.  
The only group, in which three phases were detectable and only one 
significantly differed from 1/3 of the whole negotiation (at a α of 5%) was the 
“Control Group”. In all other groups two phases do significantly differ. 
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5.2.3 Brief Summary 
Summarising the results, it has to be remarked, that the second phase in the 
three phase model presented, was significantly shorter than the other phases in 
all experimental groups. Furthermore, it did not show many significant 
behavioural characteristics and could therefore be considered a “transitional 
period/phase” where negotiators change their strategy and pass from the 
differentiation phase to the integration phase, as the first and the third phase 
show significant results indicating such behaviour.  
It can therefore be concluded that a three phase model can be detected in a 
more fine grained structure to detect when negotiators change their strategy, 
but finally, in relation with the behaviour, negotiators shift from more competitive 
to more cooperative moves during the negotiation process.  
This outcome resembles other empirical investigations from researchers testing 
three phase models and concluding that, in general, they are kind of similar to 
two phase models as negotiators just become more cooperative over time 
(Adair & Brett, 2005). 
Further researchers, however, could investigate whether the behaviour 
discriminates from the whole negotiation when taking into account 
subcategories and thus analyse the whole process in more detail. Furthermore, 
an interesting question would also be whether any significant between group 
differences are detectable. 
5.3 Four Phases 
To split the negotiations into four phases, a holistic approach has been used as 
well.  
5.3.1 Detectable Behaviour 
Whether communicative acts have been used significantly more or less in each 
phase out of the four detected phases, compared to the average use of this 
type of communicative act during the whole negotiation, has been investigated 
and the results are summarised in table 15 and 16. 
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4 Phases Control Tree 
1. Make Concession 1 -   4 + 1 -    
2. Ask or Give Priority 
Information  2 -    
 
   
3. Show Social Support   3 -  1 -    
4. Positional Offer 1 +    1 +   4 - 
5. Give Positional Information 1 +   4 - 1 +   4 - 
6. Show Negative Response 1 -    1 -    
7. Use Tactics and Contention     1 -    
8. Substantiate Position 1 -     2 -   
9. Process Variables 1 -   4 +    4 + 
 
Numbers: phase number 
+: Communicative acts used significantly more in phase than on average 
-:  Communicative acts used significantly less in phase than on average 
Plain text:  effect significant at 5% confidence level (α=0,05) 
Underlined:  effect significant at 1% confidence level (α=0,01) 
Table 15: Significant Differences in Phase Structures~ Control & Tree Group ~ 4 Phases 
 History Dance 
1. Make Concession 1 -    1 -   4 + 
2. Ask or Give Priority 
Information         
3. Show Social Support         
4. Positional Offer 1 +   4 -   3 + 4 - 
5. Give Positional Information    4 -    4 - 
6. Show Negative Response 1 -    1 -    
7. Use Tactics and Contention 1 -    1 - 2 -   
8. Substantiate Position  2 -  4 +   3 -  
9. Process Variables   3 - 4 +    4 + 
 
Numbers: phase number 
+: Communicative acts used significantly more in phase than on average 
-:  Communicative acts used significantly less in phase than on average 
Plain text:  effect significant at 5% confidence level (α=0,05) 
Underlined:  effect significant at 1% confidence level (α=0,01) 
Table 16: Significant Differences in Phase Structures ~History & Dance Group ~ 4 Phases 
For each experimental group, the outcome will now be described and compared 
to the sequential four stage model proposed by Adair and Brett (2005) who 
predict that negotiations can be divided into four sequential stages. In the first 
negotiation phase counterparts negotiate in a competitive way, using power and 
influencing the counterpart. In the second phase, more cooperative moves are 
used by negotiators and focus is led on the exchange of priority information. In 
the third negotiation phase counterparts return to behave in a more competitive 
way, before they finally pass to the fourth phase where mutual acceptable 
agreements are searched as negotiators possess enough information. 
During the first phase, negotiators in the “Control Group” did make significantly 
less concessions and significantly more positional offers. Furthermore, 
significantly more positional information was exchanged and significantly less 
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negative emotions shown. Apart from that, negotiators substantiate significantly 
less their own position and talk significantly less about process. In the second 
and third phase only one significant result (at a α of 5%) shows up for each 
phase. Communicative acts of the second category “Ask or give Priority 
Information” were significantly less used in the second phase and social support 
significantly less shown in the third negotiation phase. In the fourth negotiation 
phase significantly more concessions were made than on average during the 
whole negotiation process, significantly less positional information was 
exchanged and communication about process was significantly higher. 
The model of Adair and Brett (2005) describes the first phase as a period in 
which affective persuasion and relational positioning are focused. The first 
negotiation phase detected shows similar behavioural significances. The 
second phase does not reveal any significant behavioural pattern, apart from 
the significant lesser priority information exchanged which contradicts theory as, 
referring to Adair and Brett (2005) information exchange is emphasised in the 
second negotiation phase. The results for the third phase show that negotiators 
did show significantly less social support during the third negotiation phase, but 
apart from this, no outcomes are significant. Adair and Brett (2005), state that 
the third negotiation phase is characterised by a renewed dance of offerings 
and a return to competitive behaviour, but the results, if at all, just indicate that 
negotiators probably behave in a more distributive way as they show 
significantly less social support than on average during the whole negotiation. In 
the forth negotiation phase, called “Reaching Agreement” in the four phase 
model identified in face-to-face negotiations, people in the “Control Group” 
made significantly more concessions and less positional offers which implies 
that negotiators finally approached each other and this kind of behaviour 
resembles in a way the “Reaching Agreement” phase described by Adair and 
Brett (2005).  
The phase structure in the “Tree Group” does not show four significant different 
phases neither. In the second phase significantly more substantive behaviour is 
used but apart from this, in the second and third phase, communicative acts of 
any category were not used significantly more or less than during the whole 
negotiation process. The first phase, however, discriminates significantly from 
the rest of the negotiation and resembles the first phase in the two phase 
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model. In the fourth phase, significantly less positional offers were made and 
positional information provided. Furthermore, process oriented communication 
was significantly higher in the forth phase.  
In general, the phase structure detected demonstrates again that negotiators 
start in a distributive manner and finish in a more integrative or at least less 
distributive way. Four separated phases make a more fine grained 
determination of splitting points possible, but the behaviour in the second as 
well as the third phase is not significant different than the behaviour during the 
whole negotiation. The same is pretty much true for the “History Group”. 
The phase structure detected in the “Dance Group” however leads to very 
interesting insights. In this group significantly more positional offers were made 
in the third phase of the negotiation and therefore admit that negotiators 
returned to an exchange of positional offers in the third phase, before finally 
passing to a fourth phase in which this kind of behaviour appeared significantly 
less. Apart from this, negotiators made significantly less concessions in the first, 
and significantly more in the fourth phase of the negotiation process. Tactics 
were used significantly less in the first and second negotiation phase and 
negative responses were significantly less in the first phase. Positional 
information was significantly less exchanged in the fourth stage of negotiation 
and process oriented negotiation significantly more.  
To investigate what happened in each phase independently, all four phases 
were analysed and the results are now presented.  
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Figure 25: Relative Shares of Communicative Acts ~ 4 Phases ~Dance Group 
Figure 25 illustrates in a clear way that, after a first phase, characterised by 
exchanged positional offers and positional information (together almost 50% of 
the communicative acts used), negotiators pass to a second phase and the 
percentage of communicative acts for concession making more than doubles in 
comparison with the first negotiation phase. The percentage of positional offers 
and positional information exchanged decreases, and social support increases. 
After the second phase, in the third negotiation phase, almost 44% of 
communicative acts are again used to send positional offers. Social support and 
concessions are reduced again. The fourth phase, then, is used for concession 
making and social support increases, whereas positional offers decrease. It can 
thus be seen that, within the four phases, people shift from competitive to 
cooperative behaviour twice. After a first phase of distribution, negotiators start 
to approach each other, but then again positional offers are exchanged before 
finally an agreement is reached as negotiators cooperate again. This phase 
structure in a way resembles the phase structure and phase model elaborated 
by Adair and Brett (2005). 
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For the other experimental groups, it was not possible to detect such a shift. 
Why this is the case and overall why negotiations supported with the negotiation 
dance graph show different phase structures than negotiations conducted in 
other experimental groups deserves further research. 
5.3.2 Phase Length 
For the four phase model the average lengths (absolute and relative) of each 
negotiation phase for all four experimental groups have been calculated as well, 
to answer the second research question. 
 Absolute Length Relative Length 
Group Ph 1 Ph 2 Ph 3 Ph 4 Ph 1 Ph 2 Ph 3 Ph 4 
Control 50,55 32,10 20,12 61,91 30,70% 19,49% 12,22% 37,59%
Tree 59,47 23,48 24,14 65,68 34,42% 13,59% 13,97% 38,01%
History 50,82 28,18 26,31 63,91 30,03% 16,65% 15,55% 37,77%
Dance 47,13 27,13 23,60 68,20 28,38% 16,34% 14,21% 41,07%
All Groups 
(Average) 51,99 27,72 23,54 64,93 30,88% 16,52% 13,99% 38,61%
 
Table 17: Average Absolute and Relative Length of Four Phases per Group 
In the four phase model the last phase consists of most communicative acts in 
all experimental groups. The two phases in the middle of the negotiation are 
shorter than the first and, as the different groups do not show significant 
between group differences, the structure is quite similar for all groups. 
The results of the t-test show that almost every phase in all four groups 
significantly differs from 1/4 of the whole negotiation.  
In the “Control Group”, the third phase is significantly shorter (α = 1%) and the 
fourth phase is significantly longer (α = 5%). 
The second and the third phase are significantly shorter (α = 1%) in the “Tree 
Group”, whereas the first and the fourth phase are significantly longer (α = 5% 
or 1%, respectively).  
The results for the groups, provided with graphical support during the 
negotiation process show, that the first phase does not significantly differ from 
one fourth of the whole negotiation, but that the second and third phase are 
significantly shorter and the fourth phase is significantly longer (α = 1%). 
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Test Variable = 0,25 
Group T df Significance (two-sided) 
Control Phase 1 1,114 14 0,284 
Control Phase 2 -1,332 14 0,204 
Control Phase 3 -10,326 14 0,000 
Control Phase 4 2,656 14 0,019 
Tree Phase 1 2,220 18 0,039 
Tree Phase 2 -5,862 18 0,000 
Tree Phase 3 -3,743 18 0,001 
Tree Phase 4 2,920 18 0,009 
History Phase 1 1,257 21 0,222 
History Phase 2 -2,795 21 0,011 
History Phase 3 -3,931 21 0,001 
History Phase 4 3,315 21 0,003 
Dance Phase 1 0,809 18 0,429 
Dance Phase 2 -4,201 18 0,001 
Dance Phase 3 -3,529 18 0,002 
Dance Phase 4 3,843 18 0,001 
 
Table 18: Length Deviations from one Quarter ~ Results 
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Figure 26: Average Relative Length of Phases in Experimental Groups, Four Phases 
In general it was not possible to find four evenly spread negotiation phases in 
any experimental group. Figure 26 illustrates clearly the dominance of the first 
and last negotiation phase in all experimental groups.  
5.3.3 Brief Summary 
The results indicate that it is not possible to detect four discrete phases in 
electronic negotiation processes, but that the phase structures differ between 
negotiations supported with the negotiation dance graph and negotiations not 
provided with this tool.  
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Whereas in the “Control Group”, the “Tree Group” and the “History Group” it 
seems that negotiators just pass from a more competitive to more cooperative 
focus in their behaviour, in the “Dance Group” it can be seen that negotiators 
switch between their strategic focus. Negotiations are started with a more 
distributive phase. This phase is followed by a more cooperative one. Then a 
more competitive phase shows up again, before negotiators finally pass to a 
cooperative phase and come to an end.  
In relation with phase length, it was not possible to detect four negotiation 
phases not significantly deviating from 1/4 of the whole negotiation process. It 
makes thus perfectly sense to use a data-driven approach when splitting 
negotiations into four phases or three phases, respectively, as the outcome 
shows that phases should not be considered as intervals, as they differ 
significantly from being equal in length. 
5.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
The purpose of this diploma thesis was the provision of further insight into the 
phase structure of electronic negotiation processes. Furthermore, focus was put 
on the investigation of the influence of different levels of negotiation support and 
graphical support tools on the phase structure of negotiation processes. In 
contrast to existing empirical studies, negotiations conducted via active 
Electronic Negotiation Systems, offering various levels of support, have been 
tested for phases.  
For the conduction of the phase analysis, a data-driven approach was used as 
this method is advantageous, because it splits all negotiations into a predefined 
amount of phases, and combines the interval-driven and event-driven approach. 
The length of negotiation phases was thus not externally imposed, but 
determined by the actual structure of the data. 
Two research questions were developed, based on a broad theoretical 
background. The first research question dealt with the possibility to detect 
various numbers of phases during the negotiation process and the behaviour of 
negotiators in different negotiation phases, as well as their similarity to phase 
models identified in face-to-face negotiations. The second research question 
aimed at investigating phase length and to explore whether interval-driven 
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approaches, splitting negotiation processes into intervals of equal length, are 
appropriate for phase analysis.  
The research intention was also to investigate, by analysing data from four 
experimental groups, having negotiated with different levels of negotiation 
support, whether different levels of negotiation support and graphical 
representation aids led to discrete phase structures during the negotiation 
process. 
An identification of two discrete negotiation phases during the negotiation 
process was possible for all experimental groups, except the “Dance Group”. 
The phase structure showing up in the “Control Group”, the “Tree Group” as 
well as the “History Group” resembles phase models identified in face-to-face 
negotiations as they can be regarded as a differentiation and an integration 
phase. The phase structure of negotiation processes identified in negotiations in 
the “Dance Group” is not that clear, leading to the assumption that behaviour, 
and subsequently phase structure, of the negotiation process is different when 
negotiators are provided with the negotiation dance graph.  
For the three phase model it can be concluded that the second stage in all three 
experimental groups could be determined a “transitional period/phase” as the 
detectable behaviour does not show many significant deviations from the 
average behaviour during the negotiation process. A three phase model does 
allow a more fine grained specification of the point when strategy changes 
during a negotiation, but finally resembles the two phase model, as a significant 
shift from distributive to integrative behaviour can be observed between the first 
and the third negotiation phase. 
When splitting negotiations into four phases, the phase structure of negotiations 
in the “Dance Group” differentiates from the other experimental groups. 
Whereas in the other experimental groups a shift from more competitive to more 
cooperative behaviour is again detectable, the phases during the negotiation 
process of negotiators, provided with the negotiation dance graph, indicate that 
a negotiator’s strategy changes three times – from competition to cooperation, 
back to competition and returning to cooperation. It could thus be stated that 
“the negotiation dance graph leads to a kind of ‘strategy dance’”. 
  
78 
As it is not obvious where the detected deviations between the “Dance Group”, 
in which negotiators were provided with highest negotiation, and graphical 
support tools, and the other experimental groups come from, further analysis is 
needed to study, for example, between group differences or behaviour in more 
detail (considering subcategories).  
As negotiation phases did not significantly deviate from being equal in length 
when splitting the negotiations into two phases, in all experimental groups, the 
interval-driven approach can be considered an appropriate tool for the 
conduction of further phase analysis. This approach is not suitable, however, if 
negotiations should be tested for more than two phases as in all experimental 
groups phases significantly differed from being equal in length. 
With this diploma thesis a deeper insight into phase structures of electronic 
negotiation processes is provided and it could be shown that graphical support 
and different levels of negotiation support, respectively, lead to differences in 
phase structures. Further researchers are invited to expand the research and 
investigate the causes of the present results. 
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German Abstract 
Um Verhandlungsprozesse zu untersuchen, können verschiedenartige 
Methoden verwendet werden. Phasenanalyse ist eine adäquate Methode um 
den Faktor „Zeit“ in die Untersuchung von Verhandlungsprozessen einfließen 
zu lassen. 
In der gegenwärtigen Diplomarbeit werden elektronische 
Verhandlungsprozesse analysiert und es wird getestet, ob verschiedenartige 
Phasenstrukturen feststellbar sind und ob diese Modellen aus der traditionellen 
Verhandlungstheorie gleichen. Um die Phasenanalyse durchzuführen, wird eine 
innovative, neuartige datengeleitete Methode angewendet.  
Die Besonderheit dieser Diplomarbeit liegt in der Untersuchung verschiedener 
Verhandlungsgruppen, die durch unterschiedliche Systeme während der 
Verhandlungen unterstützt wurden, und der daraus entstehenden Möglichkeit, 
verschiedene Phasenstrukturen zu erkennen und diese mit dem Grad der 
Unterstützung in Verbindung zu bringen. 
Da dieses Phänomen bislang nicht untersucht wurde, eröffnen sich durch die 
Analyse neue Einblicke in Phasenstrukturen elektronischer Verhandlungen und 
die Resultate der Studie deuten darauf hin, dass graphische Unterstützung, 
wenn der „Negotiation Dance Graph“ zur Verfügung gestellt wird, zu 
unterschiedlichen Verhandlungsphasen während dem Verhandlungsprozess 
führt. Unterschiede im Phasenverlauf zeigen sich im Zwei-Phasen-Modell sowie 
im Vier-Phasen-Modell zwischen der „Dance Gruppe“ und den anderen 
Experimentalgruppen. 
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Categorization Scheme 
 Main Categories Definition Sub Categories detailed description Examples 
1 concession no. of single/double room   
2 concession price of single/double room   
3 concession add. services (meals, entertainm.)   
4 concession lockout option   
5 concession cost sharing   
6 concession airport service 
make or offer a concession 
(compared to own previous 
offer) 
  
7 cond. concession no. of single/double room   
8 cond. concession price of single/double room   
9 cond. concession add. services (meals, ...)   
10 cond. concession lockout option   
11 cond. concession cost sharing   
12 cond. concession airport service 
offer a conditional 
concession (logrolling: if - 
then) 
  
13 Acceptance   
1 make concession 
Substantive 
negotiation 
behaviour that 
constitutes a 
concession or 
an agreement 
of parts of an 
offer or 
agreement to 
an offer 
package. 
14 multi issue offer   
1 request priority information May I know what your expectations are about that?            
2 request product information How many rooms do you have? 
3 reveal personal information (other than attribute related) I had a very tough meeting today and now I am tired 
4 give priority information (attribute related preferences) The price of the rooms are most important to me 
2 
ask or give 
priority 
information 
Statements 
requiring or 
providing 
information 
about needs or 
interests 
5 Clarification If you look at your last offer, you can see that 
1 show concern or express understanding (empathic com.) I understand your argument.                                               
2 show positive emotion (incl. thanking & humor) It is a great pleasure for me too.                                          
3 express apology or regret I am very sorry about that. 
C
re
at
e 
Va
lu
e 
3 show social support 
Statements that 
constitute 
emphatic 
communication 
or show 
positive 
emotions. 4 Make off-task comments (extra role) Can I have your email? 
 Main Categories Definition Sub Categories detailed description Examples 
1 positional offer no. of single/double room   
2 positional offer price of single/double room   
3 positional offer add. services (meals, etc.)   
4 postitional offer lockout option   
5 positional offer cost sharing   
6 positional offer airport service 
make initial offer or repeat a 
previous offer/position  
(also if - then) 
  
7 bottomline offer no. of single/double room   
8 bottomline offer price of single/double room   
9 bottomline offer add. services (meal, ...)   
10 bottomline offer lockout option   
11 bottomline offer cost sharing   
12 bottomline offer airport service 
offer a concession by using 
a bottomline or threat 
  
13 request concession no. single/double room   
14 request concession price single/double room   
15 request concession add. services (meal, ...)   
16 request concession lockout option   
17 request concession cost sharing   
4 positional offer 
Substantive 
negotiation 
behaviour that 
constitute 
positional 
bargaining and 
value claiming. 
18 request concession airport service 
offer a concession by using 
a bottomline or threat 
  
1 state facts about product/service/company  Our rooms have air-conditioning. 
2 self-supporting statements We have the best rooms in the City 5 
give 
positional 
information 
information 
about facts or 
statements 
intended to 
persuade 3 persuasive statements 
Okay, I really like you and I make you a very special 
offer.                                                                                     
1 reject proposals, offers or suggestions We cannot lower the price. 
2 set conditions (not related to concrete issue) If you accept all this … 6 
show 
negative 
response 
Statements 
rejecting offers 
or proposals or 
showing 
negative 
emotions 
3 show negative emotions or sarcasm ... but I have to say, that I'm really angry!  ... You cannot be serious!                                                                           
1 make commitments This is my very last offer.                                                     
2 exert pressure You have to decide until tonight. 
3 make promises In the next contract, we can offer you a better price. 
4 suggest sequential issue negotiation We should discuss the price first. 
5 refer alternative suppliers/buyers We have a better offer of a different supplier! 
7 
use tactics 
and 
contention 
Communication 
that is intended 
to influence the 
other party 
6 use authority related tactics My boss will be very unhappy 
1 stress similarities and common ground (normative) Our guests are also your guests and therefore … 
2 request understanding/accommodation (normative) Please understand that we cannot go below this price 
3 refer to fairness (normativ statement) This is a fair offer. 
4 refer to trust & relationship (normativ statement) We should think about our future relationship 
C
la
im
 V
al
ue
 
8 substantiate position 
Normative 
statements to 
substantiate 
own position 
5 express hope We hope that you understand our position 
 Main Categories Definition Sub Categories Examples 
1 time related or process coordination I cannot access Internet over the weekend 
2 system issues Do you understand how this system works? 
3 impersonal address, closing or signature Yours sincerely, Playa Beach Resort 
4 personalized address, closing or signature I wish you a very nice evening and all the best, Playa Beach Resort 
5 text structuring my offer:, etc. 
Pr
oc
es
s 
9 Process variables 
communication 
that is related 
to the 
negotiation 
process or 
specific for text-
based, 
computer-
mediated, 
asynchronous 
communication 6 redundant units & anomalies   
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